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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to collate the 
arguments both for and against increased Canadian involvement 
in Latin America with special reference to the question of 
Canadian participation in the Organization of American States.
In addition to presenting the historic arguments, 
an attempt is made to anticipate Canadian foreign policy in 
the near future with a view to fitting Latin America into 
the projection of Ottawa's external relations. Two case 
studies are discussed (Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the 
Dominican crisis of 1965) to illustrate the probable effects 
of Canadian membership in the Organization of American States.
The first chapter deals with the structure and 
function of the Organization in an attempt to clarify the 
degree of success it has attained. Throughout the thesis the 
dominant United States presence in Latin America is given 
every consideration.
In discussing Canadian involvement in Latin America 
every effort is made to consider objectively all the arguments. 
Unfortunately, the scope of the topic prohibits detailed 
scrutiny in all areas and to some degree objectivity has 
perhaps been sacrificed in the author's selection of topics.
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IN T R O D U C T IO N
Canada has undertaken a valuable and effective 
role in international affairs especially since 1945. As 
a middle power of considerable stature she has participated 
in several regional and universal organizations to her own 
benefit and that of her allies and friends. Canada is a 
member of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD),
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) and the United 
Nations (U.N.), as well as a participant in numerous trade 
and aid agencies including the Geneva Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (G.A.T.T.) and the Colombo Plan. Since 1956, the 
role of peace-keeping has become a vital aspect of Canadian 
foreign policy and negotiated peace settlement the goal of 
her international involvement. Canada's own domestic 
interests, in turn, have been geared to the prospects of the 
increasing wealth, population and interdependence in the 
world. Economically, Canadians look to their neighbours for 
capital investment and export markets. Since her own 
survival depends on trade,'*' Canada naturally is concerned with
1 J.L. Skeggs, External Trade Division, Dominion 
Bureau of Statistics (Ottawa, 196 8) notes that twenty percent 
of Canada's Gross National Product is directly dependent on 
foreign trade - the highest in the world.
I
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2increasing the stability, cooperation and viability of
the world around her. Despite her already intensive
involvement in many areas of the world, Canada remains
separated from one of the oldest existing international
association of nations. First conceived in the latter part
2
of the 19th century, the inter-American system did not 
assume its present form until after World War II under the 
Rio Treaty and the Pact of Bogota. Canada is the single 
major Western Hemispheric nation that remains outside the 
Organization despite one hundred years of economic interaction 
with Latin America.
Based on statements by successive Government 
Ministers, it appears somewhat unlikely Canada will join in 
the near future regardless of her changing position in the 
world of nations. To illustrate, on March 30, 1939 Prime 
Minister Mackenzie King told the House of Commons that 
"public opinion in favour of the Pan American Union had not 
yet become sufficiently informed or sufficiently widespread
3
and matured to warrant immediate steps to join." Twenty-two 
years later, in 1961, Howard Green, Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, stated that Canada was still waiting for 
an indicator from the majority of Canadians that such a step 
should be taken. Again, in 1968 Canada's Prime Minister is
2 A. Alvarez, "Latin America and International Law," 
American Journal of International Law, 1909 p.276 as cited 
in A.V. Thomas and A.J. Thomas, The Organization of American 
States (Dallas, 1963), p.4.
3 John B. Harbron, Canada and the Organization of 
American States (Montreal, P.Q., 1963), p.2.
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3still waiting for this onslaught of public opinion to guide
4
her entry into the Organization of American States (O.A.S.)
In addition, there is evidence to support the view that
Canadian leaders are unsure of the political consequences at
home. Howard Green, Sidney Smith, John Diefenbaker, Lester
Pearson, Paul Martin, Mitchell Sharp and Pierre Trudeau have
all stated at one time or another that they favour joining 
5
the O.A.S. However, all have been strangely quiet on this 
point after they attain a position in the Government. It 
seems that membership in the Government delineates membership 
in the O.A.S. to a considerable degree. Whatever the reasons, 
the fact is evident that neither the government nor the 
people are anxious to commit the country to a greater role 
in Latin America if membership in the O.A.S. is a prerequisite.
This paper will discuss the relationship between 
Canada and Latin America with attention to the hegemony of 
the United States in the area and an analysis of the O.A.S.;
The paper explores the conditions for Canadian membership in 
the O.A.S., with reference to the structure, functions and 
accomplishments of the Organization. Two case studies on
4 Statement by Pierre Trudeau at Liberal Party 
Workshop (Toronto, 1968), p.l.
5 Canada, House of Commons, Debates. July 15, 196 0
p. 6375, Statement by Hon. Howard Green. Ibid., April 26, 1961 
p.4032, Statement by Hon. Paul Martin. Ibid., April 17, 1961 
p.4085, Statement by Right Hon. L.B. Pearson, Globe and Mail 
(October 4, 1965), p.l, Statement by Right Hon. John Diefenbaker, 
Liberal Party Workshop Transcript, 1968, Statement by 
Right Hon. P.E. Trudeau.
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4the Dominican Republic (1965) and Cuba (1962) will be 
analyzed to demonstrate the responsibilities and restrictions 
of membership in the O.A.S.
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CHAPTER I
'THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
The present Organization of American States 
came into being formally in 1951 with the ratification 
of the Pact of Bogota signed in 1948. This Act gave 
formal validity to the Rio Treaty of 1947 incorporating 
it into the official Charter of the O.A.S. The original 
idea of a hemispheric system is attributed to Simon Bolivar. 
Bolivar's dream of a cohesive union or "confederation" of 
Latin American Provinces received its impetus on December 7, 
1824 when the dictator of Peru and titular head of Great 
Columbia sent the following message of invitation to the
g
former Spanish colonies.
The day our plenipotentiaries make the exchanges 
of their powers will stamp in the diplomatic 
history of the world an immortal epoch. When, 
after a hundred centuries, posterity shall search 
for the origin of our public law, and shall 
remember the compacts that solidified its destiny, 
they will finger with respect the protocols of the 
Isthmus. In them they will find the plan of our 
first alliances that shall sketch the mark of our 
relations with the universe.7
6 The ex-colonies were Mexico, Central America,
Great Colombia (Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela) Chile, Peru, 
United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, Bolivia and Paraquay. 
Invitations were also sent to the United States of America, 
Great Britain and Brazil.
7 John P. Humphrey, The Inter-American System;
A Canadian View (Toronto, 1942) , p.23.
5
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6The Congress which met at Panama June 23, 1826, 
did not reflect Bolivar's grandiose scheme of alliance. Of
g
the eleven invited, only four attended and, as was to be 
the case for decades after, resolutions were signed, alliances 
postulated, agreements formulated, but nothing was ratified.
The international scene was too uncertain and the precedents 
of newly gained independence too few to warrant anything 
beyond pledges of mutual coexistence and interdependence 
against colonialism. The domination of Spain's Holy 
Alliance, defeated in 1824, were soon replaced by fears 
of United States Manifest Destiny in the latter years of the 
nineteenth century.
Several states made efforts to further hispanic 
solidarity, notably at Lima in 1847 and 1864 and at Santiago 
in 1856, but the results were not immediately fruitful. What 
did emerge however was the basis for an international organ­
ization that emenated almost one hundred years later. These 
first conferences dealt principally with two issues - arbitration 
and the collection of public debts by governments. Lima 
settled the question of arbitration making mediation a point 
of international law as it applied to the Latin American 
Countries. At Santiago the Drago Doctrine prohibiting the 
collection of public debts by foreign governments, was promul­
gated. Both principles were later accepted by the U.S.A. at
8 The four Countries present were Mexico, Central 
America, Colombia and Peru.
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7the 1933 Montivideo Conference.
In summary of the period 1826-1889 it can be said
that the four major conferences served the necessary function
of continuing the "Liberator 1 s"vision of a united association
of American Nations. These early conferences were doomed to
failure for two reasons: United States - Latin American
conflict of goals, and secondly, hispanic conflicts of interest.
"Not only did profound cultural differences exist 
between the U.S.A. and its Latin American neighbours 
which tended to obstruct the inter-American 
Movements, but the policies of the U.S.A. were such 
as to preclude Hemispheric c o o p e r a t i o n '.'9
American goals of isolationism from Europe and Manifest
Destiny at home were, of course, anathema to the republics to
the south. The United States was indifferent at this time to
the area, and Bolivar's successors were too ambitious and too
fearful of losing their independence. In fact, as Alvarez
points out below, there was a multiplicity of factors which
defied cooperation.
How, indeed, were these states to overcome the 
enormous distances which separated them, the 
absolute lack of intercommunication, the highly 
developed spirit of national independence, the 
bad blood engendered by the boundary disputes, 
the conflicts over the navigation of rivers, 
the baneful influences of civil wars due to the 
personal ambitions of revolutionary leaders,the 
lack of preparation of the people for political 
life and the want of common traditions.10
9 A. Alvarez, op.cit., p.288.
10 A.V. Thomas and A.J. Thomas, op.cit., p.13.
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8The model was struck and through all this the vision 
persisted but the essential common dominator, the U.S.A. 
was missing.
The years between the Second Congress at Lima 
(1864) and the Washington Conference of October 2, 1889 
saw the wane of Pan-Americanism, but forces were emerging 
in both the United States and Latin America which revived 
the concept of a regional association of states to handle 
problems such as arbitration, intervention and mutal defense. 
James G. Blaine, U.S. Secretary of State, presided over this 
first gathering of American nations in Washington, and it 
was largely his efforts which led to the creation of the 
Union of American Republics and the Commerical Bureau of 
American Republics (which became the Pan-American Union in 
1910). It was possible to bring the states together at this 
time because conditions in both areas of the hemisphere had 
stabilized. To be sure, many differences still existed, 
(notably the 1879 War of the Pacific involving Peru, Chile, 
and Bolivia), but in general the climate toward Washington 
had changed favourably. This new atmosphere of co-operation 
was the aftermath of the cessation of southward expansion, 
the abolition of slavery and the U.S. protests against the 
French invasion of Mexico, the Spanish occupation of Santo- 
Domingo, and the intervention of Madrid in Peru. From 
Washington's point of view, stability and peace in Latin 
America meant increased markets and the exclusion of Europe 
from the Americas.
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9Successive conferences firmly established the 
hegemony of the United States of America in Latin America 
specifically the Caribbean. The Southern Republics divided 
amongst themselves were unable to form a counter-bloc to 
the power of the United States. Thus it was that Washington 
was able to suppress the formal discussion of political 
questions until 1933 at the Montevideo Conference. In the 
meantime, three additional meetings at Mexico City in 1901-2, 
at Rio de Janeiro in 1906 and at Buenos Aires in 1910 had 
produced significant results. The Commerical Bureau was 
given additional power to discuss cultural as well as commercial 
matters, several institutions were created including the 
International Commission of Jurists and the Pan-American 
Sanitary Bureau, the first steps toward formal treaty alliance 
were initiated, and despite U.S. intervention in the Caribbean 
and Central American regions under the Roosevelt Corollary to 
the Monroe Doctrine, the Pan-American Union was created.
Although there were no regular conferences held between 1910 
and 1923, numerous specialized conferences were convened, 
primarily in response to the crisis problems arising from 
World War I.
The resumption of conferences in Santiago/1923 
and Havana, 1928, reflected the growing independence of the 
Latin American Nations. Membership in the League of Nations 
and the defeat of the Central Powers drew the area closer to 
European affairs than ever before. This independence was 
reflected in the conferences which failed to support a U.S.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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bid to take constructive steps towards regional, political 
unity. It was, in effect, a warning to Washington that the 
policy question of intervention, so long considered a 
prerogative of the United States in Latin America, must be 
tempered.
How would one speak of inter-American solidarity, 
Pan-Americanism or good neighbourliness, when the 
stumbling block in the path of good relations was 
nothing less than the most powerful republic of 
the hemisphere?■*■-*-
The Good Neighbour policy of Franklin D.Roosevelt enunciated in 1933
had to be demonstrated by deeds. In 1928, the U.S. had
signed two agreements in Washington, The General Convention
of Inter-American Conciliation and the General Treaty of
Inter-American Arbitration. These agreements compelling the
signatories to arbitrate their disputes were deficient in
themselves in that they stipulated that both belligerents
in any single conflict must agree on the arbitrator. In
addition, the United States Senate attached a further
reservation that required mutual agreement on the definition
of the problem before arbitration began (le compris). The
result was that both agreements were still subordinate to
the Monroe Doctrine, and intervention was the order of the
day.
At the Montivideo Conference in 1933, this 
multinationalization of the 1823 doctrine remained the major
11 L. Quintanilla, A Latin American Speaks, 1943 
in Humphrey, op.cit., p.156.
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obstacle to formal union. Since the Havana Conference, at
which Washington reserved to herself the right to interpret
the Monroe Doctrine and notwithstanding Roosevelt's timely
announcement of the Good Neighbour Policy, the Latin American
Nations had remained suspicious of the United States's
intentions. Their fears were not justified. When the
Convention on Rights and Duties came to a vote the U.S.
concurred, including the provision on non-intervention.
Three years later, at the Buenos Aires Conference for the
Maintenance of Peace the following Additional Protocol to
Non-Intervention was also signed by all parties:
The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissable 
the intervention of any one of them, directly or 
indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the 
internal or external affairs of any other of the 
Parties.
The violation of the provinces of this article 
shall give rise to mutual consultation, with the 
object of exchanging views and seeking methods 
of peaceful adjustment. ^
This treaty can be regarded as being the turning 
point of the Inter-American system toward a true security 
organization. In repudiating the right to intervene, the 
Monroe Doctrine became the hemispheric guarantee of defensive 
alliance. Although it was still basically a weak agreement, 
the principle of continentalization, the impetus to the 
Rio Treaty of 1947, had been established. In 1938, the 
Congress of Lima created the Meeting of American Ministers 
for Foreign Affairs thus endowing the principles of
12 This provision was later adopted as Article 15 
of the Charter of the Organization of American States.
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arbitration and non-intervention with a concrete vehicle 
for enactment. Events moved rapidly in the next several 
years. World War II and the creation of the United Nations 
became the stepping stones to the creation of the 
Organization of American States.
In February of 1945, the Inter-American Conference 
on Problems of War and Peace met at Mexico City to discuss 
continental security and membership in the proposed United 
Nations. Firstly, the Act of Chapultepec extended the non­
intervention Doctrine and collective security proposals to 
include all states. This was an extension of the Havana 
resolution which had been directed at non-American states. 
Political, economic and military sanctions were authorized 
as legitimate weapons against any aggressor. Secondly, a 
reorganization of the Inter-American System was undertaken 
not only to strengthen it but also to prepare for the 
San Francisco Conference in April.
The resulting inter-American stand at San Francisco 
was based on a clear conception by the American republics of 
what their regional system was, and a determination to 
preserve it. The United Nations urged each state to deal 
primarily with its regional system before taking problems to 
the U.N. Secondly, each regional organization was given the 
right to defend itself in case of war. These provisions 
appear in the U.N. Charter as Articles 51 and 52.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Article 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective 
defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
member of the U.N....
Article 52:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the 
existence of regional arrangements or agencies 
for dealing with such matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security.
• • • •
Having reorganized the structure of their system and caused
the provision,embodied above, to be included in the United
Nations Charter, the head of the United States delegation
proclaimed that it was the intention of the U.S.A. "to
negotiate in the near future a treaty with its American
neighbours which will put the Act of Chapultepec on a
13permanent basis in harmony with the World Charter."
Two years later, nineteen of twenty-one American 
Republics (exluding Ecuador and Nicaragua) met at Quitandinha, 
Brazil and two years later, the parties signed the Inter- 
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance at Rio de Janeiro.
By this agreement the signatories reiterated their desire to 
continue their existence as a regional organ under the 
auspices of the United Nations, reaffirmed their commitment to 
the principles set forth in the Act of Chapultepec, and 
imposed obligations on themselves to refrain from intervention, 
submit to arbitration and most significant, to come to their 
mutual aid against any aggressor. In addition, the Organ of
13 Department of State Bulletin, (Washington, D.C., 
June 13, 1945), p.1009.
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Consultation was given the power to rule on the action to 
be undertaken in the event of aggression against a member 
state other than armed attack and to decide by a two-thirds 
majority the appropriate counteraction. Because of the time 
involved in convening a meeting of the Organ of Consultation 
of Foreign Ministers however, the "Council of the Organization" 
was empowered to act in its stead - a provision that has had 
very significant consequences as will be seen below.
(It is noted here that the Rio Treaty by virtue 
of Articles 3 and 6 commits the American "States" to 
supporting Canada in the event of intervention that threatens 
her territorial integrity or the "peace of America". Thus, 
Canada is protected from all forms of economic, political 
and military aggression, although she has no reciprocal 
obligations).
From March 30 to May 2, 1948, the Ninth Inter­
national Conference of American States met at Bogota to 
implement the reorganization resolution passed at Mexico 
City in 1945. The American republics attempted to give the
O.A.S. an organic core based on fundamental principles 
negotiated after one hundred and twenty-two years of inter­
action and conflict. The Organization includes three 
documents dealing with the following; defense and inter­
vention (Rio Treaty), arbitration and pacific settlement 
(Pact of Bogota) and structure and function (Charter).
The legal foundation for the Organization is a multilateral 
agreement to which all states are bound according to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 5
provisions of international law. Ratification by two-thirds 
of the states (Article 108) was completed in December 13, 1951 
with the deposit of the necessary instruments by Columbia.
By 1956 all the states had completed the process. Since 1948 
Trinidad and Tobago, a Commonwealth member, has been added 
(1967) and Cuba suspended but the Organization falls short of 
Bolivar's ideal in that the largest American state, Canada, 
is a glaring omission. In order to present a valid argument 
either for or against Canadian membership, it is necessary 
to devote some attention to the structure and functions of 
the O.A.S. and its agencies.
Part two of the O.A.S. Charter established six 
functional subordinate agencies to carry out the principles 
and purposes established in Articles 1-4.
They are the following:
1. The Inter-American Conference, supreme organ of 
the Organization which meets every five years to decide 
general action and policy.
2. The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs; which meets on?.request to consider problems of an 
urgent nature and of common interest, and which serves as 
the Organ of Consultation to deal with threats to the peace 
and security of the Continent.
3. The Council, which is composed of one representative 
from each state. It may act provisionally as Organ of 
Consultation. The Council has three organs: the Inter- 
American Economic and Social Council, the Inter-American 
Council of Jurists, and the Inter-American Cultural Council.
4. The Pan American Union, which is the central and 
permanent organ and General Secretariat of the O.A.S., with 
headquarters in Washington, D.C.
5. The Inter-American Specialized Conferences, which
deal with special technical matters and develop specific
aspects of inter-American cooperation.
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1 6
6. The Inter-American Specialized Organizations, 
which have specific functions with respect to technical 
matters of common interest to the American States. There, 
are six such agencies: Inter-American Children's Institute,
the I-A. Commission of Women, the I-A. Indian Institute,
I-A. Institute of Agricultural Sciences, the Pan American 
Health Organization and Pan American Institute of Georgraphy 
and History.
The supreme organ, the Inter-American Conference 
is the oldest having been formed in 1889, and meets according 
to Charter every five years, but sometimes special conferences 
are held.^ It is the parent organ being directly involved 
in the overall administration of the system but has surrendered 
much of its influence to the Meeting of Consultation of 
Foreign Ministers, and so has become more of a coordinating 
body. The I-A. conference for example, has the theoretical 
power to mediate conflicts and decide peace-keeping policy, but 
in reality, the organ is too large, too unwieldy and too 
impractical given the time element in any crisis. In addition, 
the Rio Treaty specifically authorizes the Organ of 
Consultation of Foreign Ministers (or in its stead the 
Provisional Organ) to consider questions involving sanctions 
where the peace and security of the Continent is endangered. 
Finally, the decisions of the Inter-American Conference are 
subject to ratification by the national government adhering 
to its ruling and this consumes valuable time also. No 
legislation is binding in the Conference although the arguments 
are still divided over treaties and resolutions and the 
difference between legal and moral obligations. Under present
14 An example of a special conference was the 
Caracas Conference in 1954.
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interpretation however, only treaties are binding15 and the 
Inter-American Conference is restricted to a recommending 
role.
The Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers/
mentioned above, also functions as the Organ of Consultation.
By Charter, this body meets only "to consider problems of
an urgent nature and of common interest to the American 
1 6States.... This organ is the modern successor of the
Meeting of Foreign Ministers created at Lima (1936) , and
provides machinery for the implementation of cooperative
consultation and action. The Meeting convenes at the request
of one member with the agreement of the others and is able
to consider any and all questions. The Inter-American
Conference, in dealing with broad policy direction, complements
the Meeting which initiates specific policy for ad hoc
situations.Like the Inter-American Conference only recommendations
to members are possible, but the moral obligation in this
body is stronger. Functioning as the Organ of Consultation is
the most critical power delegated by the Charter because this
17body is charged with the preservation of peace and security 
In view of the aforementioned inability of the Organ of 
Consultation to convene quickly, Article 12 of the Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance authorizes the Governing Board of the
15 See A.J. Thomas and A.V. Thomas, for a thorough 
discussion of this problem, op.cit., pp. 67-73.
16 Article 39 of the Charter.
17 Articles 3 and 6 of the Rio Treaty, Articles 
25 and 43 of the Charter.
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Pan American Union to act in its place as the Provisional 
Organ of Consultation. In its function as the Organ of
Consultation, decisions arrived at by two-thirds of the
18Council's members are binding. The scope of restrictions 
available to the Organ of Consultation are outlined in 
Article 8 of the Rio Treaty and need not be listed here.
In a majority of situations the Council, under Article 6, 
has called for a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers 
to consider the conflict but has set no date for this meeting. 
In the interim, the Council has taken action itself, acting 
as the Provisional Organ of Consultation. The Council, 
having taken the necessary steps to handle the problem, then 
cancels the proposed meeting of foreign ministers.
The Council of the Organization exercises adminis­
trative and supervisory control over the operations of the 
Pan-American Union at Washington, in addition to its function 
as Provisional Organ of Consultation. Each state is 
represented by an ambassador (usually the state's Washington 
representative). Article 51 of the Charter charges the 
Council with implementation of all O.A.S. resolutions and 
directives. Article 53 requires the Council to co-ordinate 
the activities of the Organization regarding all subordinate 
bodies, the specialized agencies, the Inter-American Council, 
as well as relations between all agencies and departments of 
the Organization. The three organs of the Council, listed
18 Article 20 of the Rio Treaty does not demand that 
a nation be required to use armed force except by its own 
consent.
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above, exist to promote the internal welfare and modernization 
of the various member states in each Council's particular 
technical sphere, and to coordinate their work with other 
international organizations such as those established by the 
United Nations. In addition, specialized conferences are 
held from time to time ( three hundred to date) to bring 
experts together for discussion of internal problems common 
to all the countries in South America.
The Pan American Union's duties are outlined in 
Articles 82, 83 and 84 of the Charter and consist principally 
of directing the activities of the three Councils. Additional 
subordinate agencies nominally under P.A.U. direction include 
the Inter-American Peace Committee (1940), Inter-American 
Defence Board (194 2), the Ad Hoc Committee of Special 
Representatives of Presidents of the American States (1956), 
the Informal Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (1959), 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1959) , Inter- 
American Nuclear Energy Commission (1957) and the Special 
Consultative Committee on Security (1962). Added to these 
organs are numerous bodies of a semi-official nature such as 
the Inter-American Radio Office and the Inter-American 
Postal Union.
The institutional functions of the O.A.S. and its 
agencies have been presented as outlined in the Charter and 
the Rio Treaty. A further discussion of the Organization 
in the several areas of defence, economics, social welfare,
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adherence to the spirit of the Charter, and respect for 
the principles of non-intervention and arbitration follows 
below in an attempt to decide if the O.A.S. has been success­
ful. Upon the conclusions drawn here depends, to a 
significant extent, the prospects for Canadian membership 
and the recommendations for change in the O.A.S. Article 4 
of the Charter lists the purposes of the Organization. To 
what extent purposes accord with practice is the subject of 
this third section.
Article 4 reads as follows:
The Organization of American States...proclaims the 
following essential purposes:
a. To strengthen the peace and security of the 
continent.
b. To prevent possible causes of difficulties and 
to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes 
that may arise among the Member States.
c. To provide for common action on the part of
those states in the event of aggression.
d. To seek the solution of political, juridical, 
and economic problems that may arise among 
them; and
e. To promote, by cooperative action, their 
economic, social and cultural development.
I intend to discuss the areas embodied in this statement of
purposes under the heads "Political" and "Socio-economic"
objectives. This first category concerns the prevention of
conflict, mutual cooperation for defense, and the maintenance
of peace and security in the Americas.
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Socio-economic goals pertain to the future internal 
viability of the members and require long term solutions 
unlike political problems which usually necessitate an 
ad hoc reaction to specific problems.
Political Goals;
According to the Charter of the O.A.S., the 
Organization is committed to the general goal of preventing 
conflicts of both an intramural and extra continental 
nature, (Articles 4, 24, 25), and in the event of aggression, 
committment to the collective defence of the victim. 
Aggression, by Charter, includes economic, political and 
cultural intervention as well as military. It is a further 
obligation of member'states to minimize conditions of 
potential conflict (Article 4b), to promote peace (4a), and 
to ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes (4c) . Upon 
the degree that the Organization has succeeded in accomplish­
ing these purposes, will the success or failure of the 
alliance be judged.
The adoption of treaties and resolutions does not, 
of course, eliminate the importance given to internal 
economic and political factors within a nation as the prime 
movers of that state's actions. Nor does the creation of 
international institutions ensure the implementation of 
principles and purposes. The O.A.S., like its counterparts, 
all over the globe, can only promote, resolve, encourage 
and if necessary, threaten. Enforcement prospects are 
governed by the dynamics of inter-state relations and
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national interest.
It is in the protection of the sovereignity 
and independence of states that the Organization 
has achieved its greatest success and won its 
major plaudits.19
Since 1948, the O.A.S. (backed by the military 
predominance of the U.S.A.) has succeeded in the sphere of 
continental defense. Since 1948, the only major threat,
Cuba, has been isolated through the cooperation of the 
Member states under the Rio Treaty in legitimizing Kennedy's 
embargo.
The Inter-American Defence Board, Juanta Internacional 
Defensa (JID) created at the Third Meeting of Consultation of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1942 is the theoretical vehicle 
for implementing O.A.S. military policy. Since 1948, the prime 
importance of the J.I.D. has been, in fact, as a cementing 
agent that produces a degree of mutual cooperation, solidarity 
and standardization of procedure. Under the leadership of 
the United States of America, the Organization of American 
States has implemented the spirit of the 1954 Caracas 
Resolution to the extent that the possibility of a successful 
armed attack on the continent is negligible. Thus, the 
major function of O.A.S. security procedures today, is 
directed toward the elimination of inter-American conflict.
Subversive activities sponsored by one government 
against a member state are usually reactions to inherited
19 Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes, 
November 18, 1949. (Ottawa, 1949).
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long-standing nationalist or territorial disputes; whereas,
coups are, in the main, old fashioned power struggles.
The former are the responsibility of the Council and its
organs, while the latter are supposedly outside the realm
of O.A.S. jurisdiction.
Historically, the O.A.S. has been extremely
successful in the amelioration of differences between members.
Despite the fragmentation and disunity of the American
states, the Organization has successfully mediated several
20crisis situations. In some instances (eg. Panama invasion 
of 1959) the O.A.S. has endeavored to establish its presence 
in the country by means of an investigating committee of 
neutral members which has the political backing of two-thirds 
of the member-states and the military support of the U.S.A. 
Faced with such supervision, the conflicting parties are 
loathe to continue aggressive measures. In most cases a 
return to the status quo ante-bellum is successfully concluded.
The goal of the Organization in the area of 
peace-keeping is primarily the restoration of peace and only
20 John C. Drdir, in The Organization of American States 
and the Hemisphere Crisis, (New York, 1962) lists seven crisis 
that the Organization has been successful in negotiating.
1949-50, Dominican Republic v Haiti; 1954, Guatemala Communist 
coup; 1955, Costa Rica v Nicaragua, invasion; 1957, Honduras v 
Nicaragria, boundary dispute; 1959; Panama v Cuba, guerilla 
invasion; Nicaragua v Costa Rica, guerilla action; 1960, Dominican 
Republic v Venezuela, terrorist activity; 1962, Cuban Missile 
Crisis.
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secondly, the solving of the problems leading to the
conflict. In ideological clashes (eg. Costa Rican-Nicaraguan
conflict of 1955) the O.A.S. record is less impressive.
Jerome Slater argues from an historical basis in fact that
the effectiveness of the O.A.S. in these cases depends on
the compatibility of U.S. objectives and Latin American 
21ideology. Thus dictatorships were preferable to leftist 
governments (eg. Dominican Republic and Brazil) for many years,and 
even today, rank higher in Washington's value system than 
the governments of countries like Cuba. Countries like 
Mexico and Argentina have become alienated because of this 
Washington-imposed ideological soul in the collective 
security system. There is some agitation amongst Canadians 
regarding U.S. domination of the O.A.S. The 1954 Caracas 
Resolution is an excellent example of United States 
manipulation of the Organization to reflect its own ideological 
views. This problem, however serious, has not over-ridden 
the effectiveness of the Organization and it is possible to 
state that the O.A.S. has been successful in the promotion 
and maintenance of peace.
As noted earlier, intra-state power struggles 
are outside O.A.S. jurisdiction. In reality however, U.S. 
leadership has made the O.A.S. a vehicle for the maintenance 
of preferential regimes. In Guatemala, Cuba and the 
Dominican Republic, the Organization has intervened under
21 Jerome Slater, The Organization of American 
States and United States Foreign Policy, (Ohio^ 1967) p. 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 5
the guise of the Caracas Resolution. Only the Guatemalan 
case is discussed here to illustrate the illegality of 
O.A.S. action; Cuba and the Dominican Republic will be 
considered in depth in Chapter four. The situation in 
Guatemala in 1954 deserves special mention here because it 
illustrates an important concept that potential member states 
would be wise to clarify before committing themselves.
The vagueness and ambiguity of the Caracas 
Resolution in dealing with the concept of "aggression" 
enabled the U.S. to 'legally' oppose the government of an 
independent Guatemala and cause it to be overthrown. The 
presence of numerous known communists in;the Arbenz govern­
ment and the threat of a takeover they represented prompted 
Washington to use the nationalization of the United Fruit 
Company as an excuse for U.S. intervention and support of 
the guerilla army under Castillo Armas. Using the anti­
communist resolution,the U.S. contended that acceptance of 
U.S.S.R. arms by the Arbenz government was a threat to the 
peace and security of the continent. Under the Rio Treaty, 
the United States was able to sponsor an investigation by 
the Inter-American Peace Committee thus excluding U.N. 
action in the area. The Arbenz government fell! The 
interpretation of the concept of "aggression" as outlined 
in the Rio Treaty and the Charter, is therefore; the object 
of subjective interpretation. It is not difficult to visualize 
the conflict in Ottawa had Canada been a member of the O.A.S.
241406
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Support of an Organization that is dominated by one nation's 
value system reduces the possibilities of compromise and 
total cooperation.
The greatest danger to the O.A.S. at this time is 
that the United States in attempting to preserve its 
hegemony in Latin America will ignore its special responsib­
ilities in the areas of peace-keeping and collective security. 
The regular application of treaties and the standardization 
of a clear and concise basis for O.A.S. action should be the 
immediate goals of the member states. As long as Washington 
insists on endowing the Organization with an ideological 
soul, the right of self defence as outlined in the Rio 
Treaty is impractical, if not fanciful.
In conclusion, the O.A.S. has served as a 
regional background to U.S. power in diminishing the-threat 
to the Western hemisphere. In supporting the principles of 
collective security, the U.S. has been able to cloak its 
unilateral actions in the respectability of the Organization 
of American States thus avoid political questioning at 
home, confrontation in the United Nations and criticism in 
Latin America. In the realm of peace-keeping, inconsis­
tencies regarding interpretation and policy have developed 
to the point of an open split between the U.S. and several 
other member states, such as Mexico. To some extent, the 
basic differences existing between the U.S. and Latin 
America and among the Latin American governments themselves,
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have prevented further consolidation of interests and 
goals. However in the sphere of international relations, 
the O.A.S. has been more potent and effective than in the 
areas of social and economic development.
The pursuit of hemispheric stability has resulted 
in important internal developments for the Latin American 
countries. The success of the O.A.S. in preventing open 
conflict has enabled the other members to stabilize the 
amount of money and resources usually devoted to defence,
22to minimize the appeal of radical factions within the states 
and, most important, permitted more attention to be devoted 
to the solution of domestic ills of a social and economic 
nature. It is to a consideration of these problems that the 
remainder of this chapter is devoted.
It is of course, difficult to differentiate between 
the economic and the social spheres of life. The O.A.S. 
Charter combines the two areas under one heading, Specialized 
Agencies (Article 63). The Inter American-Economic and 
Social Council, established as a permanent organ in 1948, was 
the result of over sixty years of hispanic pressure on the 
United States to aid in these areas as well as defence.
Since the days of Bolivar, the Latin American countries have 
recognized common social and economic retardation as the 
core of their domestic stagnation and external frailty.
22 Canada has Hysteria over Cuban Situation, 
Financial Post, (Dec. 17, 1960), p.2.
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Since 1914, when the Commercial Bureau of American Republics, 
the first concrete step toward Pan-Americanism was 
created, concern has revolved around economic progress as 
much as security. In 1939, when financial instability and 
World War II necessitated additional cooperation, the 
Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee 
was created. The establishment of the Inter-American 
Development Commission (1940) and the publishing of the 
Economic Charter of America became reflections of the growing 
awareness in Latin America of the immediate need for 
cooperation and joint development in the areas of trade, 
tariffs, taxes, price ceilings, resources, foreign exchange, 
inflation, devaluation, industrialization, agrarian reform 
and a host of other spheres. Thus, in 1945 the republics 
established the IA-ECOSOC to investigate and recommend joint 
measures to tackle the economic and social problems of the 
member states.
The role of the U.S.A. in the developmental process 
is of primary importance to the successful reorganization 
and reform of the Latin American domestic structure.
Political instability, military prominence and the internal 
policies of the United States have been such that Washington 
did not heed Latin American pleas for economic and social 
reform until recently. The United States refused to accept 
the responsibilities its wealth and hegemony within the 
inter-American system placed in its hands. Small numbers of 
technicians and limited credit have trickled from Washington
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since 1942 through the Institute of Inter-American Affairs 
and the Truman Four Point Plan, but U.S. business capital 
was loathe to penetrate too deeply into many of the unpred­
ictable areas of Central and South America. The threat 
of nationalization and/or expropriation, high tariff walls, 
small markets, political instability, discriminatory taxes, 
government regulations, and the presence of more favourable
markets elsewhere, all combined to restrict profound U.S.
23involvement.
At the Fourth Extraordinary meeting of the 
IA-ECOSOC in Rio de Janeiro, November 22, 1954, the United 
States made its last stand in opposition to a vast regional 
economic system. In August of 1956 Operation Pan America 
was put forth by Brazil as a possible agent to deal with 
problems of trade, development, industrialization, technolog­
ical advancement and related contingencies on a collective 
basis. In September, 1958, the United States reversed its 
traditional opposition to a regional financial institution
and the Committee of Twenty-one was created to blueprint
24
the necessary steps. This Act of Bogota, as it was formally 
ratified, contained four chapters that related to the 
conditions prevalent in all Latin American states to varying 
degrees. The headings were "Measures for Social Improvement",
23 Thomas, op.cit., presents an excellent discussion 
of the problem, pp.379-81.
24 "The Hemisphere Starts a Bank", Americas, Vol. XI, 
(June, 1959), p .2.
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"Social Development", "Economic Development", and "Multi­
lateral Cooperation". The success of the Organization of 
American States in dealing with these problem areas will be 
discussed below separately.
In December of 1959, the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB) was inaugerated with a budget of one billion 
dollars (U.S. contribution five hundred million) for the 
purpose of making credit readily available to the Latin 
American countries. Eighty-five percent of the bank's 
resources were allotted for commercial loans and fiften percent
for "soft" loans to finance operations of a non-self-liquidating 
25nature. Encouraged by the support given to the IADB, the
U.S. called for a special cabinet level economic conference 
2 6in Uruguay. By the Act of Punta del Este, Washington 
committed twenty billion dollars to the Alliance for Progress.27
The Alliance for Progress was formulated at a 
White House meeting between President Kennedy and the Latin 
American Ambassadors in March 13, 1961. The aura of unity 
and optimism stimulated rapid adoption of the plan by the 
nineteen Latin American republics (excluding Cuba), and the 
program was inaugerated on August 17, 1961. The basic 
documents underlying the Alliance are the "Declaration to the
25 Thomas, op.cit., p.388.
26 "The O.A.S. in Action,: The Task at Montivideo,"
Americas, Vol. XIII, (August, 1961), p.31.
27 7.7 billion dollars up to 1967.
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Peoples of America" and the "Charter of Punta del Este 
Establishing an Alliance for Progress Within the Framework 
of Operation Pan America". The close partnership between 
the United States and Latin America born of World War II, 
was recreated by the Alliance in which aid and reform 
became multi-national, cooperative goals.
The Alliance has not been a dynamic success -
this fact cannot be disputed - but neither has it been the
outright failure predicted by so many sceptics. The
Alliance has produced positive innovations in the social
structure which are unmeasureable at this time or are not
part of an analysis of a country's gross national product.
In both the economic and social realm, positive gains are
being made. The major successes of the program are outlined
2 8here as indicators of progress, however minor.
General:
Domestic revenues rose 4 2 percent from 1961 to 
1966 in seventeen countries. Tax collections increased 
5.6 percent per annum. Central government capital outlay 
rose 32 percent, with significant increases in education 
(48.6 percent) and agriculture (32.5 percent from 1963 to 
1966). Defense expenditures were stable at $1.8 billion 
annual average for the last four years, or less than 2 percent 
of total gross national product. Of this, 10 percent or 
less is for new equipment.
28 Department of State Bulletin, No. 59. (Washington, 
D.C., September 2, T961D .
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Industrialization:
Eight countries, with 87 percent of the total 
GNP and 8 2 percent of the population of the developing 
Alliance countries, showed manufacturing up 42 percent from 
1960 to 1966. Mining rose 22 percent.
Agricultural Productivity:
Nineteen countries averaged a 3 percent increase 
in net agricultural production since 1960, but food production 
rose 27 percent for the period 1961-67. Major increases 
reflect newly cultivated lands, mostly medium and small farms. 
New agricultural on-farm credit now reaches about 8 million 
people, or 6 percent of the rural population, who had no 
available credit before. Since 1963 Latin American central 
government expenditures on agriculture increased 38.5 percent. 
But production is barely keeping pace with population growth.
Agrarian Reform:
Fifteen countries have enacted agrarian reform laws 
and created administrative institutions to carry them out. 
Seven hundred thousand families were newly settled and 450,000 
of them received land titles. Total land distributed is 
above 8 2 million acres, or 6.3 percent of the arable land of 
Latin America. Fifty to sixty percent of this was "new land" 
(public domain); 30-40 percent was expropriated or purchased; 
10 percent was the result of private colonization efforts. 
Nearly 4 million people have benefited. But the number of 
landless families is increasing.
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Adult Illiteracy:
Available statistics show a general decrease in 
the number of adult illiterates, with two out of three Latin 
Americans now being able to read and write. Since the 
beginning of the Alliance, central government outlay for 
education has increased nearly 62 percent. Sixteen countries 
increased their education expenditures during 1967; 13 
diverted more than 15 percent of their expenditures to 
education.
Fifty-six percent of primary school age children 
are in school compared with 49 percent in 1961, while 
population increased about 3 percent annually. Following are 
specific areas of school growth:
Primary: Graduates increased 86 percent, teachers
61 percent, and classrooms 51 percent.
Secondary: Enrollment and graduates doubled.
Teachers almost doubled.
University: Enrollment growth rate averaged 9.5
percent annually during the Alliance years. This is higher 
than growth rate in U.S. universities during the same period. 
There are approximately 1 million students enrolled in 
Latin American universities, double those enrolled prior to 
the Alliance.
Vocational: Graduates in 14 countries more than
doubled, with 235,000 in 1967 against 106,000 in 1960.
Agricultural (secondary): Enrollment increased
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2.5 times; enrollment tripled in higher agricultural education.
Life Expectancy:
Infant mortality went down 12 percent through 1964 
while child mortality dropped 20 percent. Latin American 
population, meanwhile, is growing faster than any other world 
region and influences every aspect of Latin American develop­
ment.
Malaria has been stopped in 10 countries, affecting
11.5 million people.
Potable water is available to 70 percent of the 
urban population of thirteen countries. Six countries report 
providing potable water to 50 percent of the rural population.
Twenty-three new medical schools opened. Physicians 
increased 26 percent and nurses 60 percent. However, 13,800 
more doctors per year are needed for the next five years, 
and too many are being drained off to developed countries.
Health centers and posts showed a 30-40 percent 
increase from 1960 to 1965.
Construction of Low-Cost Housing:
The best indicators here are in the growth of 
housing co-ops and savings and loan associations. Co-ops 
numbered about 2,000 with 360,000 members in 1967, compared 
with 400 co-ops and 65,000 members in 1960.
Savings and loan associations increased from 
23 in four countries to 175 in 12 countries. Depositors rose
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from 50,000 to over 750,000, with deposits of over $300 
million and loans of $433 million to 82,000 borrowers.
Under the AID housing guaranty program nearly 
12,000 units were completed from 1964 to 1967.
Price Levels:
Inflation has been reduced in those countries 
where it was a serious threat. The rate in Chile went down 
from 39 percent in 1964 to 22 percent in 1967. Brazil cut 
inflation from 140 percent in 1964 to 25 percent in 1967, 
and Argentina was down from a 1966 peak of 32.3 percent to 
an estimated 10 percent in 1968.
Foreign Exchange:
The average annual increase in earnings from 
exports was 6.4 percent from 1961 to 1966. Following a 
world trade slowdown, earnings in 1967 failed to register 
any increase. The United States is working with the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to 
develop guidelines for temporary preferences by developed 
countries for all developing countries.
An Inter-American Export Promotion Center was 
created in January 1968 to stimulate the sale of Latin 
American manufactured products. The United States pledged 
$500,000 to this program. Also, the International Coffee 
Agreement was strengthened by creation of a Coffee Diversi­
fication Fund.
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Private Sector Participation in the Alliance:
The private sector in the home hemisphere and 
elsewhere is being increasingly encouraged to invest in 
econcmic development of Alliance countries. The U.S.- 
created Inter-American Investment Development Center in one 
short year of activity has promoted twenty-four possible 
projects, with an estimated investment potential of $25 million.
Economic Integration:
Since 1961 the five Central American countries - 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica - 
increased intrazonal trade 600 percent (from a very low 
initial base, admittedly) through their common market. The 
eleven South American countries of the Latin American Free 
Trade Association increased intraregional imports 135 percent 
and made 10,000 tariff and nontariff concessions.
Principal trade integration developments in the 
last two years follow:
- Panama has been invited to join the Central 
American Common Market on a progressive basis.
- A joint Latin American Free Trade Association 
Central American Common Market coordinating committee was 
established.
- LAFTA foreign ministers have met on the process 
of conversion into a common market.
- Meetings of the Inter-American Economic and 
Social Council have been held on the effects of Common 
Market integration.
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- six countries (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru and Venzuela) have organized in a subregional 
Andean Development Corporation.
- Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay 
have agreed to cooperate in the development of the 1,235,000 
square mile River Plate Basin with a population of 50 million.
- Further steps were taken to establish an inter- 
American communications network by 1973 at the recent meeting 
in Rio de Janeiro of the Inter-American Telecommunication 
Commission (CITEL).
Multinational infrastructure programs received 
added support through new pledges of $1.2 billion to the 
Inter-American Development Bank's Fund for Special Operations 
(FSO). The United States will contribute $900 million over 
the next three years to this increase, in addition to $2 
million from the U.S.-financed Social Progress Trust Fund to 
the IDB's Pre-Investment Fund for Latin American Integration.
The O.A.S. Special Development Assistance Fund 
provides technical assistance and training in support of 
multilateral efforts.
Infrastructure works are already supporting 
integration. Electric power production is up from 38 billion 
kilowatts to 100 billion kilowatts. Total road mileage 
increased by 16 percent, and paved road mileage by 58 percent.
In addition, the preparation of sound development 
programs, the compilation and analysis of basic factual 
information, hitherto notoriously sketchy, the setting of
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national priorities geared to economic and social development 
and the dissemination of large quantities of United States 
technical aid were the immediate results of the Alliance for 
Progress. The critical disappointment of the Alliance has 
been the lack of integration and positive direction it has 
fostered. Faith in the Alliance is reserved to the few in 
any Latin American country. To most the Alliance means 
simply greater U.S. aid available and more severe competition 
for that aid. Thus, multinational development programs in 
the fields of telecommunications, irrigation, and hydroelectric 
power are subordinated to national projects which may or may 
not have equal urgency. In any event, the fight for the U.S. 
dollar often encourages the formation of grandiose schemes 
while widening the gulf between the nations. Furthermore, 
the Alliance despite claims by Latin American leaders, is 
not a Latin American project. Washington's allotment of 
1.1 billion dollars per annum is distributed by projects on 
which the decisions are made in Washington. The goals of 
"self-help" and "reform" remain worthwhile concepts but 
their specific meanings must be written and implemented by 
the people of each nation. If the growth of the Central 
and South American nations depends on private investment, 
as presumed in the Charter of Punta del Este, the Latin 
American nations must assume responsibility for creating the 
necessary political and ideological climate, and for 
establishing specific priorities in the sphere of social 
reform.
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New attention has been given to the problems 
of integration and responsibility especially during the 
conferences at Buenos Aires (March, 1966),at Washington 
(June, 1966) and at the meeting of the Presidents of the 
American Nations (April, 1967). A Latin American 
Common Market excluding the United States of America 
would of necessity foster integration and interdependence. 
But even at this embryonic stage, as embodied in the 
Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), the lack of 
diversification and specialization, the recent birth of 
most home industries, the disparity in national wealth, the 
dependence on the United States market and countless other 
factors geared to parochialism and the need to export many 
of the same products has resulted in the refusal to make 
concessions and the creation and maintenance of high tariff 
walls by the members. The United States, in spite of its 
financial aid, has come under increasingly severe criticism 
from many quarters both at home and abroad. Export pre­
ferences, A.I.D. liberalization, Export-Import Bank loans, 
and an increase in the quantity of aid to that approaching 
the post-World War II Marshall Plan to Europe, have been 
the primary suggestions to overcome the stagnation within
the area of economic development under the Alliance for 
29
progress.
29 Hubert K. May, Problems and Prospects of the 
Alliance for Progress. (New York, 1968) , p.20-1.
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The political goals of the Alliance for Progress 
as outlined in the Charter of Punta del Este have largely 
been ignored. A cursory scanning of the purposes of the 
Alliance drive home the point that the economic and social 
development of the Latin American states must be viewed 
as the alternative to armed rebellion and that development 
must be geared to the preservation of democracy.
The elites in Latin American countries lack 
ideological direction, concentrate on the immediate benefits 
of the U.S. dollar, ignore the advice of and refuse to 
permit the participation of student groups, peasant 
cooperatives, trade unions, and in general impose reform 
from above rather than responding to the masses. The 
Alliance thus assumes the posture of an independent organ­
ization run by the few and dictated to the many. Based on 
successes to date, the accounting in the fiscal area is 
still in the red. For example, the 2.5 percent G.N.P. 
growth envisioned by the Alliance in 1961, has not been 
reached. To a significant extent this failure to achieve 
even this modest growth rate is primarily the result of 
two factors; the 3 percent growth rate in Latin America,and the 
large percentage of Latin American budgets geared to defence 
expenditures. The 1.6 percent average growth rate in 
G.N.P. cannot keep pace with the rise in population and 
government expenditures of 1.5 billionon defence, use up 
the great bulk of American aid.
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In order to coordinate and re-direct the
movements of the Alliance, the Committee of Experts, and the
Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress
(C.I.A.P.) must both be assigned a greater degree of
technical and political responsibility in order to achieve
cohesive political developments that will inspire a
committment to the Alliance. Senator J.K. Javits presents
a persuasive case for L.A.F.T.A. if the Alliance can
3 0become relevant to the people. The longer the people 
wait, the greater are their hopes and frustrations and in 
the not-too-distant future the more violent their 
revolution.
Without discussing all the reasons, the Alliance 
has achieved its greatest success in converting the image 
of Latin America from an area of constant instability, 
to one of relatively stability with infrequent interruptions. 
Foreign investors in the United States and Canada are 
viewing this area with a more favourable attitude. In 
the political sphere of long term direction however, the 
Alliance has failed to provide coordinated leadership and 
cohesive integration, and the United States has chosen 
to ignore the Alliance's commitment to regionalism, and 
populism. Perhaps a common market, though not a realistic
30 Jacob K. Javits, "Last Chance for a Common 
Market", Foreign Affairs, Vol. LIV. (April, 1967), p.449-462.
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3 1solution at present, will become the sole alternative.
The Alliance, like the Organization of American 
States has only been partially successful in fulfulling 
the duties assigned to it under its original Charter. 
Canadian participation within the Alliance as a donor 
nation could contribute little financial aid to augment 
its present contributions in the form of "soft loans" and 
outright grants. Indeed, Ottawa would do well to urge for 
a restructuring of the Alliance along the lines suggested 
above, before committing herself to supporting it. The 
structure and functions of the O.A.S. and the present 
direction and uses of the huge financial resources committed 
to the Alliance for Progress suggest, as I have shown, 
that a restructuring and a new dedication to original 
purposes and goals is vitally necessary, and should be a 
prerequisite for Canadian membership.
31 The question of economic integration as.a 
prerequisite for political integration in Latin America 
is thoroughly discussed in an article by Earnest B. Haas 
and Philippe C. Schmitter entitled "Economics and 
Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections 
About Unity in Latin America", International Policital 
Communities (New York, 1966), pp.258-300.
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
The Canadian attitude toward Latin America 
has traditionally been one of indifference and ignorance. 
Shielded by the United States, separated by vast geographical 
distances, an absence of historical connections, and with 
the exception of the Caribbean countries, possessing different, 
sometimes antagonistic, political systems, Canadians found 
little to warrant profound investigation of the area's 
inhabitants. Historically, culturally, politically, geograph­
ically, Europe was closer to Canada and the fact that Canada 
was land-linked to South America through the United States, 
was not sufficient to justify more than passing reference in 
Canadian newspapers to Pan Americanism, gunboat diplomacy 
or revolutionary coups.
In addition, the early years of the Canadian nation
were ones of domestic preoccupation. Until the Balfour
Declaration of 1926, the United States was suspicious of
the British Dominion.
If colonies, possessions or dominions, whose 
foreign relations are controlled by European 
States, were represented in these conferences, 
the influences and policies of European Powers 
would be injected into the discussion and 
disposition of questions affecting the political
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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entities of this hemisphere. Whatever value 
such conferences would have, it would not be 
that attaching to a conference distinctly American.3 2
Canadians were aware of U.S. hegemony in the area, and for
many,Pan Americanism was a cloak for U.S. "Manifest Destiny"
and expansion. In these early years, close allegiance to
the Crown was the safeguard against this implicit dangeriof:'"
U.S. imperialism being directed north into Canada. This
mutual distrust of motives continued to hamper close U.S.-
Canadian relations to varying degrees until 1939, when
Mackenzie King announced publicly that Canadian membership
in the Pan American Union was "a possibility which should
33
be given consideration in the future". Although the 
disclosure of official government interest in joining the 
Union was the first indication of serious Canadian interest, 
the war intervened and Canada, an active belligerent, was 
unable to follow through with concrete action.
The year 1940 saw a reawakening of Canadian 
attention to Latin America. Unable to obtain the necessary 
loans needed for the Canadian war effort because of the U.S. 
declaration of neutrality, Ottawa looked south of the U.S. 
for a hard currency market. Markets in Latin America were 
readily accessable because the .German occupation of Europe
32 Government Printing Office, 1928. Vol. I. p.583 
as quoted in Anglin, Douglas C., "United States Opposition 
to Canadian Membership in the Pan American Union: A 
Canadian View", International Organization, No. 1, Vol. XV. 
(Winter, 1961).
33 Debates, March 30, 1930. P.2430. Statement by 
Mackenzie King.
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had eliminated Latin American markets on that continent.'
i
These diplomatic exchanges were carried out between Ottawa 
and Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, and preferential trade 
agreements were signed between Ottawa and Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador and Argentina. However, even with the increased 
in trade with Latin America, approximately 29.4 percent, 
Canada still sold only 2.25 percent of her total exports to 
this area.^ More important, however, was the fact that 
initial contacts had been made and had proved fruitful as 
well as harmonious.
Tin the post World War Two years, Canadian
preoccupation with the United Nations obscured any appeal
the P.A.U. might have had for Canada.) For example, in
April of 1947, United States Senator Vandenburg issued an
invitation to Canada to join the Union, but events were
such that Ottawa and the Canadian people were already afraid
of regional organizations undermining the New World
Organization. Even after collectivism was recognized in
Canada as being a necessary evil, Prime Minister St. Laurent
declared in 1949, that the nation's destiny lay with a
North Atlantic Union and, he continued,
it has not appeared to us that there would be 
any decided advantages in formal membership in 
the Pan American Union. If there were any advantages 
we would join.35
34 Commercial Intelligence Journal, Canadian Trade 
with Latin America, May 17, 1941. pp.595-600.
35 Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes, 
November 18, 1949. p.20.
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John Holmes believes that the U.S. invitation was issued 
at this time because of the growing Soviet threat and
O £
the strategic significance of Canada. The offer was 
abandoned, however, presumably because of the Canadian 
sponsorship of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
which effectively tied Ottawa to the anti-communist league 
of nations as well as the Rio Treaty would have done.
The decade following the Bogota Conference which 
founded the Organization of American States as the 
successor to the P.A.U., witnessed an atmosphere of polite 
detachment existent between Ottawa and Washington regarding 
membership in the Organization of American States. The 
election of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1957 
coincided with a revival of Canadian interest in Latin 
America. Developments in Cuba in 1959 and the Dominican 
Republic in 1961, served to keep the question of Canadian 
involvement before the government for some time, but the 
new administration's interest waned. After 1960,attention 
in Ottawa was geared to the U.S. policy regarding Cuba 
and a fear of the effect Canada's decision to retain its 
representative in Havana and to continue trade with Castro 
would have on Canadian-American r e l a t i o n s . ^
36 Holmes, John W., Canada and Pan America, luncheon 
address delivered to the American Historical Association in 
Toronto, December, 1967.
37 "Canada has Hysteria Over Cuban Situation", 
Financial Post, (December 17, 1960), p.2.
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I In May, 1961, the question of Canadian membership 
rose again. President John F. Kennedy, in an address to 
the Canadian Parliament, invited Canada to take her "rightful 
place" in the Organization of American States.\ The 
government declined the offer, ostensibly because of the 
lack of a popular directive, but most likely because Mr. 
Diefenbaker viewed acceptance of Washington's invitation as 
bowing to U.S. pressure. It is important to note here that 
most of the Canadian newspapers and journals supported
O O
Mr. Diefenbaker1s stand. The Cuban missile crisis further 
strengthened the contention of many to adopt a wait-and-see 
attitude. The Cuban crisis brought home two profound facts 
to Canadians; firstly, the Canadian people realized how 
vulnerable their security was when the two super-powers 
decided to test each other, and secondly; the manner in 
which Washington bypassed the O.A.S. in imposing the blockade 
on Cuba, demonstrated that the Canadian position was more 
favourable outside the Organization. The year 1965, brought 
the Dominican crisis in April and the open intervention of 
U.S. troops in Santo Domingo was condemned in editorials 
across Canada. In 1967, the acceptance of Trinidad and 
Tobago, Commonwealth members, stimulated new speculation 
that Canada would now join, but the movement was weak and 
shortlived. In October 1968, the question of Canadian 
membership was one of the main political reasons for the
38 The Globe and Mail, Vancouver Sun, and the 
Financial Post were the leaders in opposing the invitation 
from Washington.
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Cabinet trip to Latin America. However, it appears that
the Latin American countries saw little benefit in Canadian
participation in the O.A.S. As an aide to Mr. Jean Luc
Pepin put it: "By and large membership seems not to matter
39that much in most (Latin American) capitals" • By 
March of 1969, the interest generated by the Cabinet trip 
had disappeared. Even Howard Green, Minister of External 
Affairs in the Diefenbaker administration, and Paul Martin,
former External Affairs Minister who have supported Canadian 
membership in the O.A.S. for over twenty-five years, have
been quoted as having changed their positions, unless the
40O.A.S. is reformed.
In short, Canadians are becoming more aware of 
the O.A.S. and of Latin America in general, but are reluctant 
to do more than observe. Contacts between Canada and Latin 
America have been intermittent and geared to the crisis 
situations rather than to the total area as an object of 
cultivation or interest. The Canadian Institute of 
International Relations publishes the International Journal 
which serves as a conveyer of those ideas which are considered 
by the Institute as being of interest to its readers, many 
of whom are academics and specialists and therefore, possible 
opinion moulders. The table below reflects the amount of
39 Globe and Mail (October 30, 1968) , p.2.
40 Paul Martin's comment in an interview with the 
author at Windsor, Ontario, March 7, 1969.
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interest in Latin America as guaged by the C.I.I.A
between 1957-67
United States of America 
United Nations 
Great Britain 
Commonwealth
- Africa
- Asia
- West Indies
- Antipodes 
Europe 
Africa 
Asia
Latin America
10
5
6 
8
19
17 
2 
5
54
14
18 
3
The sample above, may be indicative that Canadians at 
various levels of society are still relatively unaware of 
their hemispheric neighbours. Not only is familiarity 
with the region lacking, but the quantity of the material 
published by Canadian specialists seems to indicate that 
even as a field of academic study, Latin America is of 
minor significance.
Arguments in Favour of Canadian Membership in the 
Organization of American States:
in the O.A.S. advocate full membership commensurate with 
Canadian strength and developmental progress within the 
Western Hemisphere.As a member of the O.A.S., Ottawa 
would be in a position to mediate, negotiate and stabilize 
relations among the republics or between them and Washington. 
Committed to the processes of quiet diplomacy, possessing 
a reputation as a successful intermediary, reflecting a 
history of progressive evolution, stability and anti-colonialism,
Most arguments favouring Canadian involvement
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and harbouring no imperialistic ambitions or heritage,
Canada would be acceptable to the vast majority of
American states. Furthermore, Canada would be welcome as
an added North American influence to de-emphasize the
cultural, economic and power rift between the U.S.A. and
the Latin American republics. Arthur Irwin agrees that
^Canadian entry into the O.A.S. as the link between North
and South America would serve a useful purpose internationally. \
With the shift in power emphasis from Europe to Russia and
the United States, the inclusion of Canada in the O.A.S.
would present a solid, unified bloc to the U.S.S.R. and
would complete the Canadian adjustment process in accepting
41
the relatively new order of the world focus. It is the 
duty of Canada, Irwin believes, to accept her hemispheric 
responsibilities in securing the North American "power 
centre" by completing the hemispheric defence alliance.
Canada, through commitment to the Rio Treaty and the Charter 
of the Organization of American States would, it is argued, 
increase her own prestige and influence in Latin America and 
the world. At the United Nations, Canada would receive 
the support of twenty-four additional votes in the General 
Assembly; in the Council of N.A.T.O.; it would be consulted 
regarding Latin American affairs and within the O.A.S., 
it would represent the unaligned, the objective, the rational 
point of view. Canadian-American relations would in all
41 Arthur W. Irwin, "Should Canada Join the 
Organization of American States," Queen1s Quarterly, LXXII 
(Summer, 1965), p.290.
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probability, be enhanced as the U.S.A. saw Ottawa accepting 
her hemispheric responsibilities. Canada and the U.S.A. 
would not, as D.E. Smith suggests "cross horns to their 
mutual disaffection".^2 Rather, counters Professor Irwin, 
the diversity of interests among the Latin American states 
would prevent such occasions arising. Certainly, crisis 
such as the Cuban situation, could be temporarily disunifying 
but the O.A.S. would survive and gain, in effect, a greater 
degree of realism, vitality, and objectivity as a result of 
the cleavage.
A recent argument favouring Canadian membership 
is concerned with the possibility of the hemispheric nations 
forming a regional political alliance. The possibilities of 
Canada becoming Tlost' between two organizations such as the 
O.A.S. and the Western European Union is disconcerting. By 
joining the Organization beforehand, however, Canada will 
have an influence on the formation, direction, and extent 
of the regional bloc. Or, she would become the most qualified 
candidate for the leadership of a Caribbean group including 
Guyana, Trinidad, Tobago, Honduras, Jamaica. In any event, 
the Commonwealth ties with the West Indies bind Canada 
morally, and historically to protect and aid these former 
colonies - a function it could perform more effectively if 
it had a vote and a voice in the councils of the Organization 
of American States.
42 D.E. Smith, "Should Canada Join the Organization of 
American States: A Rejoinder to W. Arthur Irwin," Queen1s 
Quarterly, LXXIII, (Spring 1966), p.109.
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Possibly the strongest inducement to Canadian 
membership is that its presence in the Organization as a 
full member guarantees that the Canadian viewpoint will 
be given and will be heard. Had Canada been a member 
when the decision to suspend Cuba was taken, her particular 
stand would have been presented directly. As Canada's 
relations with the other hemispheric nations become closer, 
Ottawa will be forced to take the necessary action to safeguard 
these ties. The inter-American system is the most obvious 
instrument to guarantee that the Canadian opinion will be 
considered. Though John Holmes does not favour membership 
in the O.A.S., he does admit the practicality of the argument 
that "Canada must be present if she expects her voice to be 
heard.
\There are important economic reasons why Canada 
should join the inter-American system.\ The 1969 fact-finding 
tour is expected to produce trade agreements with the 
countries of Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. At present, 
Canadian trade with Latin America is nine hundred million 
dollars per annum,^ about 3.5 percent of total Canadian 
world trade. With the population of Latin America expanding 
at the fastest pace in the world (approximately 3 percent), 
the combined population should reach three hundred million
43 John Holmes, in an interview with the author at 
Windsor, Ontario, November 25, 1968.
44 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1967 Report.
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by 1975 providing an extensive market for potential Canadian
exports. S.J. Randall, President of General Steel Wares Ltd.,
echoed the views of many Canadian businessmen in an article
in Monetary Times. He said "the economic need for joining
the O.A.S." is such that Canada must act rapidly "before it
45is too late and the republics merge into trading blocs."
V There is a strong cultural argument for increased
— \
Canadian involvement as has been reflected in the French! 
language newspapers especially Cite Libre and Le Droit.
This appeal to the French-Canadians formerly centered around 
membership in the O.A.S. as a counter weight to involvement 
in N.A.T.O. There is a tie, however nebulous, between the 
French language and the romance Latin tongue of the hispanic 
nations, although only one Latin American nation, Haiti, is 
French speaking. The argument today, however, has less 
impact because of Ottawa's increased attention to Francophonic 
Africa and Quebec's international forays into Gabon, Niger 
and Paris. Canada, at present, has no official cultural 
exchange program with Latin America despite the rich tradition 
of French, Spanish and Portuguese culture and the heritage of 
the Inca, Aztec, Maya and Toltec civilizations existent in 
Latin America; and notwithstanding the fact that thirty percent 
of Canada is of Latin origin (French mainly). Closer ties 
with the area, it is believed, could be most easily achieved 
through O.A.S. contacts.
45 S.J. Randall, editorial in Saturday Night, LXXVI. 
(August 5, 1961).
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I By joining the Organization, Ottawa would
automatically increase its role in alllspheres; cultural,
economic and political.! The moral obligation Canada has,
to assist the poorer nations of the world, should be met
here in Latin America in her own hemisphere. The Latin
American peoples are linked to Canadians and have been
neglected too long. The dominant member of the O.A.S. has
urged Canadian membership, the body has unanimously endorsed
the invitation, and the benefits, it is argued, are obvious
and far outweigh the costs of such a move. Writing in 194 2,
John Humphrey believed he had gauged the attitude of the
Canadian people accurately when he wrote;
Canadians are much surer of themselves than 
they were twenty years ago, and they look 
to the future....They feel, moreover, that 
because of their particular relationship to 
two Great Old World cultures, they have a 
role to play in the hemisphere which fully 
justifies their continued national independence. 
Membership in the Pan American Organization 
will make that role easier to play.^6
Twenty-five years later, Arthur Irwin again interpreted
the Canadian mentality regarding Latin America. He said;
...more than forty years of observation of 
public affairs in this country impels me to 
the conviction that if lead were given... 
the Canadian people would respond positively 
as they have responded to similar challenges in 
the past.
46 John Humphrey, op.cit., p.281.
47 Arthur W. Irvin, op.cit., p.303.
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As noted in the introduction, many Canadian
statesmen believe Canada has a role to play within the
O.A.S. and in Latin America, iprime Minister Trudeau agreed
with those who support membership; he said,
As soon as we learn our role, which I hope 
will be soon, we must get into the O.A.S. 
to exercise that role.^°
Canada is in Latin America at present, in the persons of
missionaries, educators, doctors, social workers, technocrats
and C.U.S.O. volunteers. It remains for Ottawa to give
concrete expression to the potential and present Canadian-
Latin American harmony through membership in the Organization
of American States.
48 P.E. Trudeau, op.cit., p.l
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ARGUMENTS AGAINST CANADIAN MEMBERSHIP
Arguments on either side of the membership issue 
have remained relatively constant over the last six decades. 
Canadian attention to Latin America has been intermittent 
and restricted to the Caribbean; specifically the West Indies. 
An important qualification made by those who oppose Canadian 
participation in the Organization of American States, is 
that they do not oppose increased involvement on a bilateral 
basis with Latin American states. John Harbron, Ian MacDonald, 
Ian Lumsden, John Holmes and others opposing membership do so, 
primarily on the grounds that the benefits would be negligible 
in view of the restrictions and responsibilities incurred.
Many Canadians agree that the country is uninformed regarding 
Latin America and that Canada "must have a policy of its 
own...and learn to exercise it"^® before joining the O.A.S.
The contention of those who oppose immediate involvement is 
that Canada has higher priorities at present and little reason 
to designate Latin America as an area of rapid economic and 
political cultivation.
The historic obstacles to involvement are still 
present to varying degrees, iFor example, Canada is heavily 
committed to numerous international organizations at present,
4 9 P.E. Trudeau, op.cit., p.l.
56
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and the argument that Ottawa is incapable of assuming 
additional responsibilities now does have some validity 
even today.\ In addition, there is still a serious lack of 
trained experts in the area of Latin America, the cost of
50joining the O.A.S., estimated at over thirty-one million,
is prohibitive and should be allotted to repressed, aid-
receiving countries, and as Holmes says, Canada must be
selective and "avoid...the attempt to do all things with
the result that we may do nothing well, and the urge to
51be all things to all men.
fThe most familiar historical argument against 
membership is that Canada would find itself forced to take 
sides, thus risking alienation of either the Latin American 
countries as a whole, a particular faction of them (such as 
Mexico, Brazil and Chile which are the most progressive and 
often vote against Washington on serious questions regarding 
intervention) or Washington itself.') It is argued that if 
Canada and the U.S.A. are to quarrel, the issue must be one 
of serious national interest.") The prospect of Ottawa being 
forced to assume a position counter to United States interest
50 John Harbron, op.cit., p.27. Harbron estimates 
membership would cost Canada one million dollars initially, 
thirty million to fulfill its probably Inter-American 
Development Bank assessment, plus supporting costs and 
contributions to the Alliance for Progress.
51 John W. Holmes, "Our Other Hemisphere: Reflections 
on the Bahia Conference," International Journal, (Autumn, 1962) 
p .415.
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over a border dispute between two South American republics, 
is frightening, given the fact that a major Canadian foreign 
policy goal is the maintenance of a cooperative harmony 
with its greatest ally and neighbour. The Canadian-American 
relationship is both unique and profitable; if it is to be 
jeopardized the conflict must be of vital interest to both 
states.
The Commonwealth ties with the Caribbean countries
could conceivably provide Ottawa with a ready-made bloc of
which it would be the spokesman. This contention is used by
supporters of Canadian membership as being a necessary step
to increase Canadian prestige and influence around the world.
Perhaps, they argue, Canada would become the counterweight
to United States hegemony in the area,thus saving Ottawa the
embarrassment of being placed between the Latin American
and the U.S. interests. Unfortunately, experience has shown
that the Latin American republics distrust blocs, believing
they are divisive. Furthermore, it is doubtful that Canadian-
Caribbean interests and priorities would coincide given their
5 2divergent degrees of development. In support of this
counter view, John Holmes points out that experience in the
United Nations has demonstrated that;
Canadians - a pragmatic and inarticulate 
people - are intolerant of the incurably 
rhetorical Latins: The more committees we 
sit in the less well we work together.53
52 Charles Lynch, Ottawa Citizen, August 9, 1966.
53 Holmes, op.cit., p.417.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5 9
The possible economic effects of Canadian 
membership in the Organization warrant consideration here. 
Canadian economic involvement in Latin America has been 
confined to the Caribbean principally and Brazil. Coopera­
tion is based on personal business contacts and government 
trade commissions and while it is possible that membership in 
the O.A.S. would add new dimensions to Canadian commercialism 
in Latin America, it is doubtful that the Canadian businessman 
would appreciate the political subtleties included. John 
Harbron points out that a meeting of Canadian executives 
involved in Latin America, sponsored by the Canadian Institute 
of International Affairs, was split on the question of 
O.A.S. membership. Those who opposed Canadian membership 
did so on the grounds that government trade commissions were 
objective and entirely adequate. Those who favoured the 
idea thought participation in the O.A.S., or any regional
agency, would broaden contacts and increase liaison with
54all the Latin American countries. It is interesting to 
note that the more progressive Latin American countries, 
place a minimal value on the O.A.S. as a commercial or contaet 
agency. Otto Lang, Acting Minister of Mines and Northern 
Resources, for example, has said that he was convinced the 
nations he visited in 1969 (Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Columbia) 
viewed the O.A.S. as an "artificial body devoted mainly to
55the discussion of common political and developmental problems".
54 Harbron, op.cit. p.26.
55 Otto Lang, in an interview with the author in 
Winnipeg, January 23, 1969.
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The argument that Canadian membership in the 
O.A.S. would guarantee that country inclusion in the Latin 
American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) is a weak one also. The 
United States, Latin America's greatest trading partner, 
has no intention of joining such an organization, so it is 
difficult to see how Canada would benefit by doing so . ^  If 
LAFTA were to offer O.A.S. members preferential tariffs in 
a world market system, the appeal to Canadian investors 
would be greater, but here again, this is impossible in 
light of the dependence of most countries in Latin America 
on one-crop economies and the exclusion of Canada's greatest 
trading partner.
Additional economic obstacles to greater Canadian
involvement in Latin America are of a similar difficulty to
overcome. In May of 1967, prior to the Geneva Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs meeting (Kennedy Round), Mitchell Sharp
outlined the principles which would guide Canadian external
economic policy. Foremost was the reciprocity arrangements
which are essential to Canadian export growth. In Mr. Sharp's
words, "there must be a reasonable balance between concessions
57obtained and those which we (Canada) grant." It would be 
impossible for the Latin American countries to compete with 
the Commonwealth preferential trade agreements. In addition,
56 Smith, op.cit., p.107.
57 Mitchell Sharp, Address to Canadian Manufacturer's 
Association Annual Meeting, May 29, 1967. p.2.
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Mr. Sharp pointed out that Ottawa's main objective was to
increase its "traditional exports of raw materials and food- 
58stuffs." Latin America would purchase little in the
realm of primary exports at this stage in its development
when the emphasis is on industrialization and the maximization
of efficiency through the importation of manufacturing
equipment and technological advancements.
The question of Canadian public opinion regarding
O.A.S. membership is another directive that will guide the
Canadian Government's actions in Latin America. Paul Martin,
former Minister of External Affairs, has been an outspoken
and long-term advocate of O.A.S. membership for Canada.
Indeed, if the question had been considered a major policy
issue, Mr. Martin would have been compelled to resign his
Cabinet position years ago. As it stands at present,
however, public opinion has been incalculable. The government
did urge the public to express itself in 1961, but the
response was too poor to even be considered noteworthy. A
report prepared by J.C.M. Ogelsby in 1967, points out that
the majority of letters received in April of 1961, were
5 9opposed to membership. Mr. Martin believes that Canada 
has a duty to join the O.A.S. as a member of the Western 
Hemisphere but is reluctant to introduce such a motion to 
the Government until public opinion indicates support for
58 Sharp, op.cit. p.2.
59 J.C.M. Ogelsby, Report prepared for the Department 
of External Affairs, (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1967). p. 27.
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such a move.®® It appears even to Mr. Martin that;
the general Canadian opinion, however, does 
not seem to support the view that we (Canada) 
should join the Organization of American States. 1
As noted earlier, successive Canadian governments have
relied on public opinion to guide their perspective toward
the Organization of American States. The role of the public
in foreign affairs, while usually minimal in any country,
has either become crucial in this sphere of Canadian-O.A.S.
potential for some unknown reason, or is being used as a
convenient excuse for indecision. Possibly, the question of
O.A.S. membership has been of minor importance to the
Canadian government over the years, and has necessitated the
seeking of a crutch to answer the few who persist in raising
the question?
A possible though partial explanation for the 
Canadian citizens' indifference is a recent awareness that 
they are not members of any so-called Western Hemisphere.
As Holmes points out, the idea of a Western Hemisphere is a
c 2
figment of the geographer's imagination. Traditionally, 
Canadians have been intimately linked to the North Atlantic 
group of states. The idea that hemispheric unity demands 
formal Canadian adherence to an O.A.S. Charter, has been 
discarded by most Canadian academics as being unrealistic
6Q Minutes #9, External Affairs Committee, Thursday 
June 16, 1966. Statement by Hon. Paul Martin.
61 Charles Lynch, Ottawa Citizen, August 9,1966. p. 6.
62 John Holmes in an interview with the author, 
November 26, 1968.
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and artificial.
To the extent that Canada should be involved 
in foreign relations... the problems must be 
viewed in their global context.63
Canadians have become universalist in their conception of
foreign relations as demonstrated in Ottawa's relationship
with Cuba, the Chinese Peoples' Republic, its position
during the United Nation membership crisis of 1955, its
commitment to the United Nations and its multinational and
political trading outlook. To many Canadians, the Pan
American system must appear more as a United States-Latin
American historical evolution than a collective security
organization to which Canada need belong.
It is axiomatic that the foreign policy of 
a country is an expression of what it 
conceives to be in its national interest.64
The question here is whether the Organization 
of American States would serve Canada's interests more 
efficiently than continued adherence to the present policy of 
bilateral contacts? Or, conversely, would the O.A.S. impair 
Canadian efforts to expand her role in Latin America?
Membership in the Organization would add little 
to the extension of Canadian interests in Latin America. 
Canadian officials in all spheres maintain contact with their
63 Ian Macdonald, "Canada in Two Hemispheres",
Behind the Headlines, Vol. XXIII, No.6. July, 1964. p.l.
64 Paul Martin, "Aspects of Canada and United States 
Foreign Policies", Address given at East Lansing, Michigan, 
February 25, 1967. p.l.
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counterparts in the Latin nations through diplomatic 
missions, trade commissions, international organs; such 
as, United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America 
(UNECLA), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations 
Economic, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and 
Pan American institutions such as the Inter-American 
Statistical Institute (IASI), Inter-American Radio Office 
(IARO), Pan American Institute of Geography and History 
(PAIGH). In addition, there is constant cooperation in 
the fields of labour, technology, education, social welfare, 
urban problems and so on. Canadians work as teachers, 
missionaries, social workers and CUSO volunteers in all the 
Latin American nations. In 1964, a new dimension, foreign 
aid, was added to the extent of $152.2 million through the 
Export Credits Insurance Act. (Section 21A).
/similarly, Canadian contacts on a bilateral basis 
have been very successful as demonstrated by the Cabinet 
trip headed by Mr. Sharp in October of 1968. The Canadian 
officials were especially successful in the negotiation 
of trade and cultural agreements between Canada and Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia,Peru, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and 
Guatemala. )
65 Paul Martin, "Some reflections on the Principles 
Underlying Canadian Foreign Policy", Address given at 
Waterloo University, (May 22, 1967), p.4.
66 External Affairs Monthly Report, January, 1969. 
(Ottawa: Canadian Institute of International Affairs), p.127.
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Although the question of O.A.S. membership was not included 
in Mr. Sharp's report to the House, he did say that the 
matter was "still in balance."
When the mission left for the Latin American
tour on October 27, 1968, Mr. Sharp was quoted as saying;
the most important aspect of the mission 
concerns Canadian political relationships 
with Latin America including Canada's 
relationship with the O.A.S.67
Mr. Sharp was openly disappointed by the lack of enthusiasm
displayed by the Latin American governments regarding Canadian
membership in the O.A.S. The Cabinet Mission's report could
well be a significant directive to Ottawa to postpone the
membership question for yet another four years.
In an interview with a Globe and Mail Reporter,
Mexico's Director of Tourism, Agustine Salvat, commented on
the Cabinet mission, he said;
I got no hint about Canada's political 
thinking towards Latin America. If this 
trip was in preparation for a membership ^g 
bid, I bet few Latins got to know about it.
Despite the fact that Mr. Sharp had stated before leaving
the "most important aspect" of the mission was to discuss
political relationships, he is quoted in the same article
after the trip as saying;
Canadian membership was not really important 
to Latin American countries anyway. They
67 Mitchell Sharp as quoted in the Globe and Mail, 
October 25, 1968. p.l.
68 Betty Lee, Globe and Mail, December 24, 1968. p. 7.
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want closer relations but would not take 
offense if this was not done through the
O.A.S.69
Otto Lang a member of the Canadian fact-finding mission, 
believes the majority of the Canadian Cabinet agrees with
70the Mexican External Affairs Minister, Antonio Canllo Flores, 
who said he could agree with and defend the argument that 
Canadians should develop their own relations with Latin 
America outside the O.A.S.^ Whatever the outcome of the 
foreign affairs review regarding Latin America, it is certain 
that the January Latin American excursion will be significant 
in that the trip eliminated the illusions of many Canadian 
statesmen who envisioned the republics as hosts anxious for 
the important guest to arrive.
It is not difficult to comprehend the lack of 
enthusiasm of the Latin nations toward Canadian membership.
In spite of superficial appearances to the contrary, the 
Alliance is not a homogenous one. There are striking economic, 
political and ethnic differences between the Latin American 
countries themselves as well as the obvious discrepancies 
between them and the United States. For example, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to discover the common denominator 
between the Creole-speaking Negroes that comprise ninety 
percent of Haiti and the Spanish of Costa Rica. The former 
has a one-crop economy based on coffee; the latter relies on
69 Ibid.
70 Interview with author, Winnipeg, January 1969.
71 Lee, op.cit. p.7.
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cacao, coffee and bananas. The political structures are 
antagonistic; the former an entrenched dictatorship; the 
latter a stable democracy.
Internally, few Canadians realize the persistent
instability of the vast majority of the Latin American
republics. All except Chile, Mexico and Uruguay have suffered
cit least one illegal change of government since 1 9 4 8 . ^ 2
Externally, the picture is again, one of instability and
antagonism. Border clashes and ideological conflicts are
traditions, guerilla warfare is prospering and the majority
have suffered continual outside interference both from
Washington and their neighbours. The historic result is that
each nation is highly sensitive, possessing different ideas
of what role the O.A.S. should play. For example, Mexico
and the larger republics see the Organization as primarily a
collective security arrangement, while the U.S.A. and the
smaller nations, (dependent on Washington to a great extent)
7 3see the O.A.S. as the guarantor of democracy. If one 
adds to this list of inconsistencies the open split between 
the most progressive Latin republics and the United States, 
it becomes easier to understand the fears of many Canadian 
Members of Parliament who applauded Stanley Knowles when he 
said in the House that he hoped
72 Slater, bp.cit., p.276.
73 Ibid. p.271.
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the Canadian government will continue to 
be sceptical about accepting the full 
implications of membership, (and) Parliament 
should have the opportunity to discuss (this) 
before we have been taken down the path to 
a situation that might involve us in defence, 
monetary and trade relations that would make 
us more a satellite than we are now of the 
main power in the Organization of American 
States.74
Having outlined the arguments for and against 
Canadian participation in the O.A.S., it would be appropriate 
here to discuss the possible effect of membership on the 
Canadian position in two crisis situations involving Cuba 
in 1962 and the Dominican Republic in 1965. In addition to 
discussing the relative positions taken by the O.A.S. and 
Canada on the two instances, an attempt is made to discern 
the probable effect of Canadian membership on Ottawa's eventual 
stand.
The Cuban Crisis:
The Canadian position vis-a-vis the Cuban crisis 
in 1962 differed from that of the O.A.S., not on basic 
principles but on tactics. Whereas both the O.A.S. and 
Canada took the position that Soviet short and middle range 
missiles in Cuba represented a serious offensive threat to 
the Western Hemisphere, Ottawa believed restraint and caution 
would be more effective in preventing an international 
confrontation. Had Canada been a member of the O.A.S. the 
pressure on the government to agree with the O.A.S. action
74 Debates, November 29, 1968.
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in supporting the U.S. trade embargo and Severing diplomatic:
ties with Havana would not have been much greater than was
the pressure imposed by the Kennedy forces. However, the
element of time was an important factor in the eventual
tr^
Canadian position. Diefenbaker, though informed nineteen
hour$ before John F. Kennedy's public announcement of the
blockade at noon, Monday, October 22, did not announce support
of the United States quarantine until Thursday, October 25.
Had Canada been a participant in the Organization of American
States' discussions begun at 8:00 a.m. Tuesday, October 23,
it would have been placed in the unavoidable position of
commitment or abstention. The motion endorsing Washington's
action passed in the Organization of American States by a
vote of nineteen to nothing.
Diefenbaker's fear of being viewed as the obedient
follower of the United States was one of the major factors
in his refusal to grant automatic public support to the
Kennedy proposal,
One of the least effective ways of persuading 
Canada to adopt a policy is for the President 
of another country to...tell us what we should 
do. ^ 5
Although enunciated in response to an offer by Kennedy to 
join the O.A.S., the sentiment has remained the same well 
into the nineteen sixties and was especially keen during the 
Cuban affair.
75 Debates, Vol. I, 1960-1, pp.700-1.
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The eventual Canadian position regarding the 
missile crisis was definitely in sympathy with the O.A.S. 
membership, but did not go as far as confirmation of the 
United States embargo. The Canadian attitude toward trade 
restrictions on Cuba and diplomatic relations with the 
Castro regime had been formulated in October 1960, and has 
never changed even after the missile crisis (1962) and 
change of government (1963). Had Canada been in the O.A.S. 
during the missile crisis, its position today would have 
been outwardly the same as that of the United States. Even 
Mexico, Brazil and Bolivia, which opposed U.S. moves to 
isolate Cuba in 1960 and again in 1962, felt compelled to 
support Washington in October of 1962. The motion outlined 
below passed the O.A.S. Organization of Consultation Meeting 
the day after Kennedy's embargo announcement. In summary,
1. If found by "...in controvertible evidence..." 
that "...Cuba...has secretly endangered the 
peace of the continent by permitting the 
establishment of intermediate and middle 
range missiles on its territory by the Sino- 
Soviet powers...."
2. It called "...for the immediate dismantling 
and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and 
other weapons with offensive capability."
3. It recommended "...that the member states, 
in accordance with Article six and eight of 
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprical 
Assistance, take all measures...which they 
may deem necessary... to prevent the missiles 
in Cuba...from ever becoming an active threat
to the peace and security of the continent...."76
76 New York Times, October 24, 1962. p.22.
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Canada would have been legally compelled to support the 
resolution. The proof of Soviet missile bases in Cuba was 
well documented, and as a signatory to the Rio Treaty,
Ottawa1s only alternative to supporting the motion would 
have been to abstain in which case it was bound under 
Article nineteen of the Rio Treaty, which becomes operative 
if two-thirds of the members support a resolution.
The divergence of views in Ottawa and Washington,
was primarily the result of the difference in attitudes toward
Latin America. Neither the missile threat nor the necessity
of joining in the quarantine were considered in Ottawa as
requiring Canadian involvement. To be sure,the threat was
real to most Canadians, but they viewed the crisis solution
as being in the hands of the "Great Powers". Thus the
Canadian government withheld announcement of public support
for the embargo; delayed the placing of Canadian NORAD forces
on the alert and urged "free men everywhere" to remain calm
7 7and not to "panic". While ascertaining its own official 
position on the crisis in private, one fact was made clear 
to the public; Canada did support the U.S.A. position regarding 
point two of the Punta del Este resolution which demanded the 
dismantling and withdrawal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba.
The question centred around how far Canada would support the 
follow-up quarantine of Cuba. The personal relationship 
between the President and the Prime Minister and the ever present
77 Robert Reford, Canada and Three Crisis, Toronto:
C.I.I.A., (December, 1968T^ p .206.
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Canadian fear of satillitism, both profound influences on 
Diefenbaker, prevented immediate Canadian acceptance of the 
United States' position. Having been informed, not consulted, 
only hours before the announcement of the embargo, the 
Government resented United States expectations of immediate 
and full public support. Senator Charles Foulkes, former 
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff during NORAD negotations, 
elucidated the Canadian position with respect to hemispheric 
crisis, and Canadian-American cooperation to defend against 
them. He said,
Canada has to be consulted every time the
U.S. contemplates using force anywhere in
the world.
Since Canada was not, in Diefenbaker's opinion, consulted but 
informed, and then only hours before public announcement of 
United States action, Canada could not have been expected to 
regard the missile problem as a serious threat to itself 
but rather as a potential one, if U.S. counteraction failed.
In any event, the Canadian reaction to Washington's unilateral 
declaration, though confused and delayed, was an independent 
one arrived at after profound and extensive discussion at 
all levels. Diefenbaker's position, right or wrong, was an 
independent position that would not have been open to a 
member of the Organization of American States.
The Dominican Crisis:
The Dominican crisis in 1965 presented another
78 Reford, op.cit. p.209.
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situation similar to the Cuban missile crisis in which the 
Canadian position differed from that of the United States 
and the Organization of American States.
The intervention of the U.S. in the Dominican
Republic in April of 1965 was 'legitimized' by the O.A.S.
on May 6 at the Tenth Reunion of the Foreign Ministers of
the Organization. By a vote of fourteen to five, the U.S.A.
succeeded in getting the minimum necessary support for the
creation of the first O.A.S. military peacekeeping force
known as the Fuerza Inter-Americana de la Paz (FIP.) The
landing of thirty thousand marines to protect foreign
nationals in Santo Domingo was also justified under the guise
that there was a serious threat of a communist takeover of
the reins of government. In support of this premise, the
CIA produced a list of fifty-three suspected communist 
7 9sympathizers, hardly sufficient justification for the 
breaking of the O.A.S. Charter, which prohibits intervention 
in the internal affairs of a member state.
The reaction of Canadian news media to the U.S. 
intervention centred on criticism of the unilateral nature 
of the action and most hoped that the O.A.S. would bring order 
out of chaos. In Parliament, Prime Minister Pearson and 
External Affairs Minister Paul Martin, expressed the same 
fears and hopes. While Mr. Martin "gratefully acknowledged"
7 9 Ian Schlanders, Backwater War that Could Shake 
the Whole World, MacLeans Magazine, Vol. LXXVIII, July 24, 1965.
p . 20.
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the protection provided Canadian citizens by the United States
marines, noted that the Canadian government disagreed with
8 0the unilateral aspect of Washington's intervention. The 
Canadian spokesmen were hesitant on the question of U.S. 
intervention for over a month after the April 24th revolution 
broke out. Aware of the seriousness of the situation in 
which Washington found herself, both in the O.A.S. and the 
U.N., Ottawa was reluctant to add its critical voice to the 
rest of the world. Until May 28, the government refused to 
answer directly, questions concerning the Dominican Republic, 
and then only after repeated insistence on the part of the 
Opposition.
Had Canada been a member of the O.A.S. her position 
would have clearly been a critical one. The United States 
resolution at the Foreign Ministers Conference required a 
two-thirds majority if Washington was to receive O.A.S. 
endorsement. The Canadian Foreign Minister would have held 
the decisive vote in a very clear cut situation. Would Canada 
have voted for her ally despite the obvious objections to 
U.S. action among the Canadian public and press? The choice 
for Canada would have been especially troublesome because an 
abstention on the vote would have had the effect of opposing 
the resolution. The vote fourteen-five-nothing, a bare two- 
thirds majority, would have become fourteen-five-one in which
80 Debates, May 28, 1965. p.1776. Statement by 
Paul Martin.
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case the resolution would have failed.
It is possible to speculate that Canada would not 
have voted for the resolution. The Progressive Conservatives 
and the New Democrats, in addition to the press, declared 
the United States'action "illegal" and a violation of inter-
p 1
national law.OJ- In supporting Washington, the Canadian 
government would have been in opposition to what were then
p 2
some of the most progressive republics in Latin America,
and sanctioned the actions not only of the United States
marines but also of the other nations that contributed troops
to the F.I.D., that is, the dictatorships of Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Brazil.
Despite the possible outcome, the fact remains
that Canadian action would have been criticized in any event.
In supporting the Americans,perhaps Ottawa would have received
a number of diplomatic credits from Washington. Perhaps,
as John Holmes believes;
Canadians did not like the way the United 
States handled the Dominican affair. The 
rest thanked God we did not have to make 
any decisions ourselves.^
Canadian policy makers would be wise to consider seriously
the benefits of their country's present status vis-a-vis
the O.A.S. and the United States. Free to follow her own
81 Debates, May 21, 1965. p.1560 and May 25, 1965. p.1608.
82 Mexico, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay.
83 John W. Holmes, Canada and Pan America, p.181.
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independent foreign policy, unhampered by the necessity of 
assuming a rigid position, Ottawa can better negotiate the 
dips and swells of her relationship with Washington.
Both the Cuban and the Dominican Republic affairs
demonstrate the possible restrictions membership in the O.A.S.
could place on Canadian foreign policy. As a member of the
Organization of American States, Ottawa's traditional loyalties
to Washington and the Commonwealth would be compromised.
Dedicated to the principles of sovereignity and the fostering
of a stronger United Nations, Canadian membership in the
Organization would prove incompatible because of United States
domination and use of the O.A.S. to cloak its own unilateral
actions. Jerome Slater, in a paper entitled, The Limits of
Letigimization in International Organizations: The O.A.S. and
the Dominican crisis, came to the following conclusion:
The Dominican experience is apparently viewed 
by the majority of O.A.S. states as more of a 
warning than a precedent, and it is probable 
that the role of the Organization in inter and 
intra state political conflict has entered a 
decline. The attitude of the Chileans, Mexicans 
and Uruguayans - we may have to live with U.S. 
domination of the hemisphere but we don't have to 
institutionalize and legitimate it by giving the 
O.A.S. political authority - may now be becoming 
the prevailing o n e . 84
84 Jerome Slater, The Limits of Legitimization in 
International Organizations: The O.A.S. and the Dominican 
Crisis (New York: 1968).
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CHAPTER IV
ANTICIPATED CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY
The dominating question in Canadian-Latin American 
relations concerns membership in the Organization of 
American States. Indeed, many Canadians view political Latin 
America as synonymous with the Organization of American States, 
and increased involvement with the former means, to many, 
membership in the latter.®^ As discussed above, proponents 
of membership see the O.A.S. as a hemispheric responsibility, 
a Canadian duty, a necessary contribution to the development 
of Latin America, and a counterweight to U.S. hegemony in the 
area. Opponents believe Canada is overburdened with inter­
national commitments to the United Nations, N.A.T.O., the 
Commonwealth and most recently to la Francophonie, and therefore, 
could not assume additional responsibilities at this time.
They envision Canada as being caught in the middle of any 
United States-Latin American confrontation, as having too 
much to lose and too little to gain.
This section outlines Canadian views on Latin 
America and attempts to fit increased involvement in Latin 
America into the overall spectrum of anticipated Canadian 
foreign policy. It is hoped that this discussion will 
provide additional insight into the arguments concerning
85 Ogelsby, op.cit. p.18.
77
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membership.
Canada and Latin America - A Projection on Future Relations:
To what extent Canada should be involved in any 
particular area of the world is a question which must be 
answered in its global context. As the largest of the small 
powers, Canada's position and influence was much different 
in 1945 than it is today. Immediately after World War II,
Canada was the fourth strongest power in the world militarily, 
the fifth largest exporter, one of the few countries untouched 
by the war, and the leader of the middle and small powers.
Today, the world is much larger with twice the number of 
independent states; the Canadian export economy, though still 
strong, is now seventh in the world; the million men under 
arms in 1945 has been reduced to one-tenth of its former size, 
and the balance of power has become a "balance of terror" 
dominated by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. Europe has been 
revitalized and the third world has been born. As Prime Minister 
Trudeau has written, "realism in how we read the world barometer 
...in how we see ourselves thriving in the climate it forecasts 
must be the prime directive of Canadian foreign policy.
Professor B.E. Burton has succinctly outlined the 
basic determinants of Canadian external policy^ as being: the 
presence of the U.S.A., the bicultural nature of the country, 
the Canadian style of mediation, and the Canadian capability.
86 Statement by Pierre Elliott Trudeau, May 29, 1968, p.2.
87 Bruce E. Burton, "Canada's Position in the World,"
The World and the School No. 14, (October, 1968), pp.19-27.
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Little elaboration,if any, is needed concerning the limitations
that its giant neighbour to the south places on Canada. For
obvious reasons Ottawa is forced to consider her special
relationship with the world's larged: power as being of prime
importance. In addition, the Canadian style of "quiet
diplomacy" and peaceful negotiation has been so successful that
it is doubtful that Messrs. Sharp and Trudeau desire to trade
it in for a louder but perhaps less effective approach. As
Mr. Burton points out;
Consensus building, mediating interpreting, 
keeping the talks going, and holding things 
together come naturally to the central political 
elites of a federal state characterized by a 
relatively small, bilingual, polycultural, 
polyethnic population sprawled over a vast 
extent of territory and over several regions.
To study the projected direction and scope of Canada's 
foreign policy in the near future the two most important 
variables are her biculturalism and her national capabilities.
Is Canada in a position to contribute significantly to the 
positive development of the O.A.S.7 Indeed, is it in her 
interests to do so at this time, given the historical and 
cultural priorities on her external aid, the goals of her 
foreign policy, and the domestic contingencies with which she 
must contend?
In the last fifteen years Canadian biculturalism 
has emerged,demanding recognition. Though it is impossible to 
fashion an external policy based on the total Canadian ethnic
88 Ibid. p .26 .
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mosaic, the two official cultures are now being reflected
in Canadian policy directives. According to the 1961 census
approximately 43.8 percent of Canadians are of British origin
and 30.4 percent of French stock. Prime Minister Trudeau,
and those who elected him in June of 1968, believe Canadian
foreign policy must reflect the realities of the nation's
new found "dual nationality". And so, the quiet revolution
within the East Block in Ottawa has created a new "Relations
among French-Speaking States Division", has placed a new
emphasis on la Francophonie, has accelerated the Canadian
aid program and has encouraged the Prime Minister to declare
that Canada's major foreign policy goal is;
to ensure the political survival of Canada 
as a federal and bilingual sovereign state....
It means reflecting in our foreign relations 
the cultural diversity and bilingualism of 
Canada as faithfully as p o s s i b l e . 89
The selection of a dynamic foreign policy based on 
Prime Minister Trudeau's model, acceptable to both French and 
English Canadians, and contributive to the nation's political 
unity at home must, of course, involve a significant increase 
in attention and aid to French-speaking countries. In the 
last four to five years, Canadian officials in the Department 
of External Affairs have followed this popular directive in 
the political, economic and cultural spheres of foreign policy.
Francophone Africa has been the prime target for 
Canadian government investment in all three areas. In the
89 Trudeau, op.cit., p.6.
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area of foreign aid, Canada has increased its total aid
program from an average annual amount of three hundred
thousand dollars to $22.1 million in 1969. These figures
not only represent a huge percentage increase in terms of
aid to Francophone Africa, but also take on an added
significance when seen in comparison to the total aid allotted
to Latin America over the last four years. Aid to the Latin
American republics has averaged only $5.57 million per annum'
and has remained static for that p e r i o d . ^  This increase in
aid to Africa is indicative of two facts; the capability of
the country to support an enlarged aid program has risen and
the orientation for this increase will be principally French-
speaking Africa, Mr. Trudeau has confirmed this second fact.
He has said, that"Canada must allot a "substantially increased
share of our (Canada's) aid...to Francophone countries as
an important investment both in improving bilateral relations
91and in contributing to national unity." Lack of cohesion 
at home is the most serious problem facing Canadians at 
present, and is likely to remain so in the immediate future. 
With this fact in mind, it is important that the Canadian 
government discern an international role for Canada which has 
a cementing influence at home. In the realm of foreign 
policy, Africa has been chosen as the principal field for 
Ottawa's cultivation. French-speaking Africa is the best 
proving ground for Canada's new bilingual, bicultural foreign
90 Canadian International Development Agency, Queen's 
Printer, (Ottawa: 1967-8), p.9.
91 Trudeau, op.cit. p.6.
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aid program. To achieve maximum impact, Canada is obliged
to select relatively few areas of the globe for her particular
attention. As Ian Macdonald writes;
We must avoid ... the attempt to do all 
things with the result that we may do 
nothing w e l l . 92
At the same time, Canada cannot abandon her commitments to
the Commonwealth members; therefore, contemporary obligations
will be continued at their present pace and the increase will
be granted to the twenty nations of Francophone Africa.
While Latin America has also received additional
funds for development through Canadian contributions, to the
Inter-American Development-Bank (IADB),the ties of history
outside the Caribbean, are non-existent and the obligation
less urgent, less compelling. John Holmes raises the pertinent
question here;
Is there anything special about South America 
which makes an association with it more 
natural than with Japan or Europe, or Australia, 
or India?93
Ideally, all countries of the globe are legitimate objects
of any state's attention, but for Ottawa, the "urge to be all
94
things to all men" must, as mentioned, be suppressed by
reality. Aid to French-speaking Africa has run four hundred
95percent higher than to Latin America in 1968-1969 and Canada
92 Macdonald, op.cit., p.4.
93 John W. Holmes, "Reflections on the Bohia Conference"
p . 415.
94 Macdonald, op.cit. p.4.
95 Department of External Affairs, Monthly Bulletin,
Vol. XX. No. 11, November, 1968, p.474.
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has made its choice, if dollars are any indicator of preference 
or direction.^
In addition to linguistic similarity, Africa offers 
Canada a place to establish her presence. Unlike the Western 
Hemisphere where United States hegemony is obvious and 
restricting, French-speaking Africa is free of United States 
domination. The competition is less avid and the opportunities 
are correspondingly much greater in the dark continent. It 
is difficult to visualize any substantial alteration in the 
new Canadian commitment to Africa, and it is impossible for 
Ottawa to concentrate on a third area of the globe at present 
or in the immediate future.
Canada's limited capabilities to exert influence 
in the Western Hemisphere are an axiom of her foreign policy. 
The American presence in South and Central America is such 
that Canada would be the "weak sister" in any regional 
organization such as the Organization of American States.
For example, the Canadian foreign aid allotment to the entire 
world is only one-eighth of that contributed by Washington 
to Latin America alone. The Canadian financial allotment on 
a bilateral basis has remained stable at ten million dollars 
to the I.A.D.B. since 1964 and the projection is the same 
for 1970. As long as this token gesture is the total Canadian
96 Report of the Canadian Ministerial Mission to Latin 
America, October TT, 1968, Queen's Printer, (Ottawa: 1968), 
Canadian development assistance to Latin America is only 
three percent of her total world program of economic 
development, p.11.
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contribution to Latin America (excluding the Caribbean), 
the bulk of Latin America will continue to remain a secondary 
bloc of nations in the realm of Canadian external policy.
In a second area for comparison of the Canadian 
attitude toward Francophone Africa and Latin America, that 
of cultural inter-action, the evidence is even more revealing, 
The table below demonstrates the rapid awareness in Ottawa 
of the benefits of pursuing a bilingual approach in the 
realm of cultural interchange.
CANADA - FRANCOPHONE AFRICA CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM 97
Number of Participants 
1964 1967
1
83
26
98
330
310
Category
Advisors
Teachers
Students
Percent Increase
9800
400
1200
The table portrays a program that is still in the embryonic 
stage. However, the progress being made in terms of the 
number of participants indicates a definite bid on the 
Canadian government's part to extend the cultural exchange 
program to every French-speaking African nation. By contrast, 
Ottawa, which has had economic ties with Latin America for 
one hundred years, and diplomatic representation for thirty- 
five years, has not yet made the effort to establish an 
official cultural exchange program with the republics of
97 Canadian International Development Agency, 
Annual Review (Ottawa: 1968), p.20.
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Central and South America.
In a third sphere, that of diplomacy and official 
exchange of missions, Francophone Africa has again been the 
major goal of Canadian expansion. In Latin America there has 
not been an addition to the fourteen resident Canadian missions, 
including those in the Caribbean, since 1963. Those missions 
already present in Latin America are, in addition, being 
maintained at minimal s t a n d a r d s . By comparison, Canada 
has added five resident missions in French-speaking Africa in 
1969 making a total of twelve established in twelve years.
In this indicative area of official relations between govern­
ments, the trend again is toward a maintenance of-present quotas 
in Latin America and the fostering of increased contacts with 
French-speaking Africa.
The fourth element of Canada's external relationships 
is economic. Canadian economic survival as the world's fifth 
largest trading nation depends on the continual securing of 
new markets for Canadian exports. In this all-important search, 
Latin America's projected population of four hundred million 
by 1972, should be very attractive to Canadian investors.
It is interesting to note that Colo.mbia has the oldest trading 
agreement with Canada; drawn up in 1866, the contract is still 
in e f f e c t . D e s p i t e  the long-term commercial relationship 
between Canada and Latin America, and the fact that Canadian- 
Latin American trade has surpassed the one billion dollar level,
98 Mission to Latin America, op.cit., p.36.
99 J.H. Warren, address given in Montreal, Tuesday, 
February 7, 1967, p.2.
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Latin America is still heavily dependent on the United States's 
market and on concessions from the State Department in 
Washington. It is significant that in one hundred and two 
years of trading, no more than 5 percent of total Canadian exports 
have ever gone south of the U.S.
The future commerical development of Latin America, 
while it looks promising considering the creation of several 
regional trade organs such as the Central American Common 
Market (CACM), and the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) 
is also misleading. Canadian export markets are uncommonly 
a'1 political in contrast to the politically restricted markets 
of the U.S.A., the U..S.S.R., Japan, West Germany and so on.
Because they trade in all areas of the world, including Cuba 
and the two Chinas, Canadians are more responsive to all 
potential markets. With this fact in mind, it seems quite 
evident that Canadian exporters are looking to Japan to 
absorb an ever increasing percentage of Canada's exports. The 
rapid growth of Japanese trade with Canada since 1955, prompted 
the Japanese Economic Planning Agency to predict that Canada 
will sell one billion dollars worth of goods annually to Japan 
by 1970^^^ making Japan Canada's second largest trading partner.
There are other reasons for Canadian investors and 
exporters looking elsewhere than the republics of Latin 
America for market potential. For example, the prospect of a 
North Atlantic Free Trade Area is still viable as long as the
100 Macdonald, op.cit. p.21.
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G.A.T.T. talks continue. Secondly, Canada is looking for 
a market that has reached a level of development that will 
guarantee the highest rate of importation. Japan with a 
rapidly expanding consumer base and a high level of consumption 
is readily available; Latin America is not.
It is evident that Latin America will not occupy a 
special place in the economic, cultural or political plans 
of the Canadian government. The factors discussed above are 
only a few of the basic tenets which indicate a cultural 
and political wooing of Francophone Africa and a"commercial 
awakening to the immediate appeal of the Japanese market.
It is a surity that Canadian-Latin American relations will 
continue to expand as a natural outgrowth of rising Canadian 
economic capability and Latin American internal development. 
However, there is no priority urging greater Canadian involve­
ment in the Latin Republics. As John Holmes, former Under­
secretary of State of External Affairs has pointed out:
Canada has nothing to gain from Latin
America that is not available elsewhere. 1^1
101 John W. Holmes in an interview with the author, 
November 28, 1968 in Windsor.
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